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WHY CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ARE SO DIFFERENT:
A FORGOTTEN HISTORY
Ion Meyn*
Much has been written about the origins of civil procedure. Yet little is
known about the origins of criminal procedure, even though it governs how
millions of cases in federal and state courts are litigated each year. This
Article’s examination of criminal procedure’s origin story questions the
prevailing notion that civil and criminal procedure require different
treatment. The Article’s starting point is the first draft of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure—confidential in 1941 and since forgotten. The draft
reveals that reformers of criminal procedure turned to the new rules of civil
procedure for guidance. The contents of this draft shed light on an
extraordinary moment: reformers initially proposed that all litigation in the
United States, civil and criminal, be governed by a unified procedural code.
The implementation of this original vision of a unified code would have had
dramatic implications for how criminal law is practiced and perceived today.
The advisory committee’s final product in 1944, however, set criminal
litigation on a very different course. Transcripts of the committee’s initial
meetings reveal that the final code of criminal procedure emerged from the
clash of ideas presented by two committee members, James Robinson and
Alexander Holtzoff. Holtzoff’s traditional views would ultimately persuade
other members, cleaving criminal procedure from civil procedure.
Since then, differences in civil and criminal litigation have become
entrenched and normalized. Yet, at the time the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were drafted, a unified code was not just a plausible alternative
but the only proposal. The draft’s challenge to the prevailing notion that
civil and criminal wrongs inherently require different procedural treatment
is a critical contribution to the growing debate over whether the absence of
discovery in criminal procedure is justified in light of discovery tools
afforded by civil procedure. The first draft of criminal procedure, which
called for uniform rules to govern proceedings in all civil and criminal
courtrooms, suggests the possibility that current resistance to unification is,
to a significant degree, historically contingent.
* Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. The author expresses special
thanks to Joseph Hoffmann, Carissa Hessick, Brad Snyder, David Schwartz, Daniel
McConkie, Brooke Coleman, Anthony O’Rourke, Howard Erlanger, Miriam Seifter, Russell
Gold, and Sandra Mayson for their close review and insights.
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INTRODUCTION
Spurred by the reform of federal civil procedure that transformed litigation
in 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court appointed an advisory committee to draft
the first Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in February 1941. Over the
next six months, committee Reporter James J. Robinson and his staff sifted
through public commentary and existing law to create a new set of rules
governing criminal disputes. Confidential and never publicly circulated, this
first draft was ultimately forgotten.1 What it reveals, however, is
extraordinary: the original conception of the Federal Code of Criminal
Procedure integrated the rules of civil procedure. The advisory committee
had drafted a unified code of procedure that would have governed all
litigation in federal courts, civil and criminal, and which would have
influenced reform in the majority of states.
The committee’s final product in 1944, however, fundamentally differed
from its original draft. As a result, criminal litigation was placed on a vastly
different course than civil litigation. A transcript of the first meetings
provides a window into what led to this divergence—a clash between the
views of Robinson and Alexander Holtzoff, the committee’s secretary.2
1. The draft was found with the expert assistance of reference librarian Kris Turner at
the University of Wisconsin Law School and his counterpart at Harvard Law School. The
copy was discovered in the collection left by Sheldon Glueck, an influential law professor at
Harvard. Glueck served on the advisory committee appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1941 to draft the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appointment of Advisory Comm. on
Rules in Criminal Cases, 312 U.S. 717 (1941).
2. These transcripts are retained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
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Robinson’s proposal would have retained the parallelism between civil and
criminal procedure that had persisted for centuries at common law. Because
recent reform to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had transformed
litigation, Robinson’s approach would have been equally transformative.
Holtzoff, in contrast, sought to preserve existing practices and resisted, in
large degree, any course correction. Because Holtzoff persuaded others on
the committee of his view, the resulting reform effort of criminal procedure
did not embrace change, but resisted it. The repercussions were enormous,
as many states adopted the federal template as their own.3
Given the committee’s ultimate decision to reject a unified code, litigating
civil and criminal matters is now different, and starkly so. To compare
modern criminal and civil procedure is not to compare apples to oranges, but,
as David A. Sklansky and Stephen C. Yeazell observed, to compare
“tangerines [to] socket wrenches.”4 Where civil procedure gives parties
agency by affording them formal power to investigate facts, criminal
procedure deems a criminal defendant a passive participant who makes
choices based on information managed by the prosecutor. And where civil
litigation can generate significant pretrial disputes, criminal procedure
permits less friction and is protective of state leverage. The design of
criminal procedure facilitates prosecution—from charging to sentencing.
The efficiency of the criminal process, however, threatens the quality of
information that supports prosecutions and facilitates the high-volume
processing associated with mass incarceration.
Despite the significant consequences of its procedural design, there is
surprisingly little understanding of criminal procedure’s origin. Yet the
practice of criminal procedure is now entrenched. As a consequence,
scholars bold enough to question the differences between civil and criminal
procedure do so tentatively. For example, when Sklansky and Yeazell
recently asked whether the two codes might benefit from some degree of
cross-pollination, they framed their inquiry cautiously. They stated, “[w]e
certainly do not contend that civil and criminal cases have no important
differences and should be treated the same,” adding that any careless
comparison could be “dangerously misleading” and ignore “large
differences.”5 The original design of federal criminal procedure, however,
demonstrates that these “large differences” were not inevitable or even the
most likely outcome.6 The current iteration of criminal procedure was in fact
the alternate, later-considered option. The initial draft envisioned a unified
code that would shape and govern all litigation in the United States. Legal
scholars continue to question the procedural boundary between civil and

3. See Jerold H. Israel, On Recognizing Variations in State Criminal Procedure, 15 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 485 (1982) (observing that more than half of state criminal procedure
codes are influenced by federal reform).
4. David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home:
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 684
(2006).
5. Id. at 685.
6. Id.
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criminal disputes,7 and some jurisdictions begin to permit the infiltration of
civil procedure into criminal disputes.8 This Article’s historical findings
further destabilize the prevailing notion that civil and criminal wrongs
inherently require different procedural treatment.
Part I of this Article describes the procedural path shared by civil and
criminal disputes at common law and surveys various criticisms of common
law. This background reveals that civil and criminal disputes were more alike
than different. Part II then charts the path of how civil procedure reformers
turned to equitable principles to reimagine dispute resolution and, in turn,
how these changes led reformers to consider similar changes to criminal
procedure. Part III is the heart of this Article: source material that was
confidential at the time of drafting reveals both that the first draft of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contemplated the integration of civil

7. See generally Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of
Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585 (2005) (favoring reforms that
integrate civil discovery tools into criminal adjudication); Russell M. Gold et al., Civilizing
Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (proposing integration of civil
discovery rules to inform plea bargaining); Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH.
L. REV. 87 (2017) (challenging presumptions over the demarcation between civil and criminal
disputes); Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes,
79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091 (2014) [hereinafter Meyn, Discovery and Darkness] (analyzing
discovery procedures available to civil and criminal law litigants); Ion Meyn, The Unbearable
Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39 (2014) [hereinafter Meyn, Unbearable
Lightness] (comparing each pretrial moment, through a procedural lens, in civil and criminal
disputes); Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to
New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541 (proposing depositions for criminal cases); Jenny
Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and
Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2004) (observing that the
low community standard that defines adequacy of counsel in criminal cases is linked to the
lack of discovery available in criminal cases); Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming
Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79 (2008) (challenging justifications for a civil and
criminal procedural divide). This recent scholarship follows earlier efforts to provide a critical
lens as to differences between civil and criminal procedure, beginning with Jerome Hall’s
foundational piece. See Jerome Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51
YALE L.J. 723, 723 (1942); see also Robert L. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal
Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 316 (1960) (questioning the lack of discovery in criminal
disputes); Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1192 (1960) (advocating for the creation of “a free
deposition and discovery procedure”).
8. See Darryl K. Brown, Discovery in State Criminal Justice, in ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE:
A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (Erik Luna ed., forthcoming
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2951166 [https://perma.cc/7A2JZWE7] (surveying jurisdictions that have integrated civil discovery rules into criminal codes);
Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39 CARDOZO L. REV.
(forthcoming
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2982512
[https://perma.cc/K3WU-9GAG]; Meyn, Discovery and Darkness, supra note 7, at 1110
(identifying the minority of state jurisdictions that permit depositions in criminal cases); Jenia
I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases: An
Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 288 & n.5, 302–06 (2016) (finding that
though ten states have “closed-file” policies, twenty-three states are experimenting with
broadening the disclosure obligations of prosecutors, while seventeen other states have
adopted “open-file” policies with liberal disclosure obligations); id. at 289 (“While discovery
rules continue to vary significantly from state to state, a recent trend has been in the direction
of earlier and broader discovery.”).
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rules and that reformers saw a unified code of procedure as the path forward.
Based on the original draft and transcripts of the first committee meetings,
Part III traces how the committee uncoupled civil from criminal procedure.
Finally, Part IV suggests that certain factors may have contributed to this
outcome, including institutional bias, gravitation toward existing practices,
and a lack of any explicit objectives to lead reform. The Article concludes
that this origin story destabilizes the prevailing conception that criminal
disputes require different procedural treatment than civil disputes.
I. THE COMMON LAW:
CREATING COMMON CAUSE FOR REFORM
For centuries, criminal and civil disputes shared a similar procedural
pathway.9 Governed by the common law, civil and criminal disputes
occurred in two stages: pleading and trial.10 Criminal and civil litigants were
required to present a single issue against a single defendant in accordance
with precise, unyielding language.11 This deep structure of common law was
exported to the United States, preserving a procedural parallelism.12 “[T]he
rules and principles of pleading with respect to . . . a civil action are
applicable to [a criminal] indictment,” wrote William L. Clark in 1918;

9. Emerging from the Magna Carta, common law procedures replaced trials by ordeal
and the arbitrary pronouncements of local elders, establishing a consistency in rights and
remedies that bound peasants, clergy, and the king alike. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 916 (1987). There was virtue in the common law’s conservatism: the
principle that only “specific facts would trigger specific legal consequences” resisted the
arbitrary application of law and the justice-distorting pressures of social networks, class, and
political power. Id.
10. See JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 13–
14 (1969); BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 8–9 (3d ed. 1923);
Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 347, 350–
52 (2003). The pleadings stage determined whether a plaintiff had a cognizable claim and, if
so, endeavored to identify precisely the dispute’s legal and factual topography. See Charles E.
Clark, History, Systems, and Functions of Pleading, 5 AM. L. SCH. REV. 716, 717 (1926).
11. See Stubblefield v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W. 444, 445 (Ky. 1923) (noting that the
particularities of pleading in criminal law “emanated from the extreme technical exactness of
the common law with reference to pleading in both civil and criminal causes”); 1 JAMES
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 508 (MacMillan & Co.
ed. 1883); Franklin G. Fessenden, Improvement in Criminal Pleading, 10 HARV. L. REV. 98,
99 (1896) (“As in ancient days the test was whether the case could be brought to fit the writ,
so now the inquiry many times is whether the case fits the form of indictment.”); see also
Tomlinson v. Territory, 33 P. 950, 952 (N.M. 1893) (“There being but one count in the
indictment, not more than one offense could properly be proved. It is a principle of commonlaw pleading, applicable to both civil and criminal cases, that all pleadings must be single.”);
Ronald Hamowy, F.A. Hayek and the Common Law, 23 CATO J. 241, 248 (2003) (describing
pleading requirements as to civil disputes); Subrin, supra note 9, at 915. As to the reference
to “litigants,” until the professionalization of police and the rise of public prosecutors in the
late 1800s, it was most common for a private citizen to serve as a plaintiff in criminal law
actions. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 424 (5th ed.
1956).
12. See WILLIAM L. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE viii–x (William E.
Mikell ed., 2d ed. 1918) (indicating there are two stages, pleading and trial); Subrin, supra
note 9, at 926–27.
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“where the criminal law is silent as to the form of an indictment in a particular
case,” a litigant could look to “pleading in civil actions” for guidance.13
The desire to reform civil and criminal procedure responded to a shared
criticism. A state court commented in 1923 that criticism “emanated from
the extreme technical exactness of the common law with reference to
pleading in both civil and criminal causes.”14 Individual efforts of any
attorney to improve the clarity of pleadings presented great risks: “[t]he
pleader is fearful lest, in departing from time-honored forms, he may put the
[case] in peril of failure.”15 To the plaintiff or the prosecutor, the pleading
phase might have felt like a sword fight in a minefield; one’s own step could
be as fatal as the opponent’s attack.16 Examples abound. For a
Massachusetts prosecutor, alleging that a crime took place “on the fifteenth
day of July, 1855” was deemed insufficient for lacking guidance as to the
era—was it “B.C.” or “A.D.?”17 A North Carolina prosecutor’s description
of killing an animal in the “field of another” deviated too much from “in an
enclosure not surrounded by a lawful fence,” the required language.18 In a
civil action alleging the defendant broke two gates and three hedges, the
plaintiff fatally failed to specify later in the complaint that the defendant had
broken the “aforesaid” gates and hedges.19 The advance to trial was thus
vulnerable to a judge using a technical defect to stall or dismiss the case.
These technicalities seemed intractable. Subject to a slow trajectory of
growth, the common law also resisted change. A treatise in 1918 observed
that “[n]o inconsiderable portion of the difficulties in the way of the criminal
pleader, at common law, have been removed . . . in most of the states in the
American Union.”20 Criticism of common law procedure, however, only
gained momentum. “[L]egal procedure,” wrote Professor Hugh E. Willis in

13. CLARK, supra note 12, at 158.
14. Stubblefield, 246 S.W. at 445.
15. Fessenden, supra note 11, at 99. Indicative of the treacherous waters faced by
prosecutors, Francis Wharton’s 1918 treatise warned that if a statute criminalizing escape used
the words “[f]eloniously and unlawfully,” a prosecutor’s failure to state these exact words
would be fatal to the indictment. 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
793 (James M. Kerr ed., 10th ed. 1918).
16. CLARK, supra note 12, at 157–217. Expressing a similar sentiment, Frederick Pollock,
a correspondent of Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote in 1912,
Perverse ingenuity, once let loose on the art of pleading, went . . . from bad to
worse . . . . [A] strictly logical adherence to consequences would have brought the
business of the Courts to a dead-lock . . . . In many cases there were alternative
forms of procedure having different incidents wholly unconnected with the
substance of the case . . . [and] it was often difficult to be sure what the proper form
of action was.
Frederick Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 387, 387 (1912).
17. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OR NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 220 (4th ed. 1895).
18. Id. at 228 & n.5 (discussing State v. Staton, 66 N.C. 640 (1872)). Bishop provided
another example: merely alleging that a person broke and entered into a house would
disqualify an indictment that required the language “dwelling-house of another.” Id. at 346.
19. HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS
333–34 (1871).
20. WHARTON, supra note 15, at 183.
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1922, “has [become] an end.”21 Capturing the sense that common law could
not attend to the sweeping changes of the industrial age, one commentator
wrote, “We have made wonderful improvements in discoveries and
inventions to save time . . . but in the courts we still move as slowly as the
travelers that in olden times creeped along in oxcarts and canal-boats.”22
Common law’s rigidity and its prohibitions on joinder could not attend to
the growth of complex legal relationships between government, individuals,
and enterprise—or to the growth of organized crime.23 If a litigant survived
the pleading gauntlet, parties faced a pretrial lacuna, as there was no formal
period of discovery and investigation. Parties instead looked toward the trial
horizon in darkness. At trial, parties presented surprise documents and
witnesses that had not been subjected to any meaningful pretrial evaluation.
Add to this frustration the procedural variances between neighboring
jurisdictions, and the drumbeat for reform quickened. As one writer stated,
“No petty tinkering, here and there, with existing law will suffice. Our codes
and statutes as to procedure should not be minute. They should give the
courts more latitude in making flexible rules and in exercising a reasonable
discretion.”24 By the mid-nineteenth century, notable statewide efforts began
to present viable alternatives to the common law’s cabined approach as
reformers proposed the integration of equitable principles “to escape
procedural restraints in order to do substantive justice.”25
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE REFORM
In response to criticism of common law, civil reformers looked to equity
for innovation. Courts of equity had developed in tandem with common law
disputes, relieving civil litigants from “an alleged injustice that would result
from rigorous application of the common law” by providing alternative
procedures and remedies.26 By disposing of the jury, equity courts could
exercise significant discretion in determining substantive and factual issues
21. Hugh E. Willis, Proposed Procedural Reform, 5 ILL. L.Q. 17, 20 (1922).
22. E.J. McDermott, Delays and Reversals on Technical Grounds in Civil and Criminal
Trials, 45 AM. L. REV. 356, 356 (1911).
23. See Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE
L.J. 387, 390–91 (1935).
24. McDermott, supra note 22, at 369.
25. Subrin, supra note 9, at 926.
26. Id. at 918. Courts of equity did not resolve criminal cases—rather, the state brought
a criminal case, and the state was limited to bringing actions and pursuing remedies that were
provided for by statute. See, e.g., Taylor v. Woods, 52 Ala. 474, 478 (1875) (“All causes,
whether in equity or at law, had but two grand classifications, civil and criminal. The latter
comprehends only violations of the criminal law—causes at the common law, in which the
crown, or with us the State, complains of violated law and broken peace, in which all
individual right and interest are lost, and merged in the greater right and interest of the
sovereign.”); Johnson v. State, 171 S.W. 1128, 1132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914) (Davidson, J.,
dissenting) (“I have been taught from the time I studied equity jurisprudence that there is a
rule of equity, not criminal law, the substance of which is that he who seeks equity must come
into court with clean hands or do equity. In that instance the plaintiff or complaining party is
seeking equity in a civil matter. It cannot be a criminal prosecution. The rules of equity are
resorted to in civil matters when the law has failed of remedies. It is fundamental that a
criminal prosecution is not an equity case.”).
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at any point of the litigation, blurring boundaries between pleading and trial.
Courts sitting in equity compelled parties to appear and answer questions
before trial, presaging the deposition.27 Equity courts invited parties to
furnish the backstory to disagreements to inform decision-making. Set free
from the common law’s “search for a single issue,”28 disputes could absorb
“as many [i]ssues of [l]aw or of [f]act as the [p]leaders desired.”29
These innovations inspired efforts to reform civil procedure. In 1879,
Connecticut ambitiously merged equity and law, initiated a lawsuit through
a “simple statement of pleading,” and permitted joinder of parties and claims
that arose from the same transaction.30 More modest in scope but influencing
reform in thirty states, David Dudley Field spearheaded an effort to replace
common law’s issue pleading with “code pleading” in 1848.31 The Field
Code discarded pleading requirements as it erected new ones; it abandoned
forms of action and technical terms of art, and a plaintiff now pleaded
“ultimate facts,” leading to disputes over whether a fact was ultimate,
evidentiary, or conclusory.32 Complicating the picture, legislative attempts
to modify the Field Code drew criticism for undermining cohesion between
rules.33 These unpopular incursions led some commentators to conclude that
the legislature had “neither the time nor the facilities to inquire into detailed
problems of judicial procedure or to formulate complete codes.”34

27. Subrin, supra note 9, at 919.
28. Id.
29. KOFFLER & REPPY, supra note 10, at 519.
30. William C. Bruce, Joinder of Claims, Parties, and Counterclaims: A Proposal for
Revision of the Connecticut Provisions, 51 CONN. B.J. 354, 365 (1977); see also Report of
Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law, 19 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 411, 425
(1896).
31. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 118 (5th ed.
2009). Code pleading jurisdictions required plaintiffs to plead the “ultimate facts” that were
essential to the underlying legal claim, as opposed to “mere evidence,” a distinction that
resulted in much litigation and disagreement over the specificity of facts required to make a
valid claim. Id. at 123.
32. Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435,
450 (1958) (“The intent and effect of the rules [of civil procedure] is to permit the claim to be
stated in general terms; the rules are designed to discourage battles over mere form of
statement and to sweep away the needless controversies which the codes permitted that served
either to delay trial on the merits or to prevent a party from having a trial because of mistakes
in statement.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8 advisory committee’s note to 1955 proposed
amendment)); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a
General Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 454–55 (1990) (discussing the
significance of the Field Code’s reforms).
33. See Homer Cummings, The New Criminal Rules—Another Triumph of the Democratic
Process, 31 A.B.A. J. 236, 236 (1945) (“As a result of amendments passed by the legislature
from year to year, the original [Field] Code became so burdened with detailed requirements
that it practically broke down of its own weight.”).
34. George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: 1, 55 YALE L.J.
694, 702 (1946); see also Clark, supra note 32, at 443 (stating that, prior to reform in 1938,
“constant amendments of procedure by the legislature were all too well known; they were
perhaps the most prominent argument for reform”). Those practicing criminal law shared
similar feelings. See Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States:
Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 76th Cong. 8–9 (1939)
[hereinafter Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2].
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As statewide reforms responded to the criticisms of common law
procedure,35 the New Deal ethos of centralized social reform and reliance on
expertise to shape policy provided additional impetus to turn over reform to
the judiciary.36 In 1934, Congress enabled the Supreme Court to achieve
uniformity through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.37 The Court had
discretion in how to proceed. It could have codified existing practices or
drafted an entirely new set of rules, and it could have done so through broad
consensus or in relative secrecy. Yale Law School Dean Charles E. Clark
viewed an insular drafting process as critical to reimagining a code that would
“meet the needs of an increasingly complex social organization for efficient
and workable court machinery.”38 Clark sought to avoid the repackaging of
existing practices, believing an insular approach would facilitate intellectual
freedom in the absence of a constant reminder of perceived constraints.39
Clark’s predictions seemed to bear out: the Court appointed a committee
that produced innovative rules through a series of confidential meetings.
Clark, who served as the committee’s reporter, took cues from statewide
efforts as the committee merged law and equity.40 Stephen N. Subrin
succinctly identified significant features of the new rules of civil procedure:
“ease of pleading,” “broad joinder,” “expansive [pretrial] discovery,”
“greater judicial power and discretion,” “control over juries,” “reliance on
professional experts,” “reliance on documentation,” and “disengagement of
substance, procedure, and remedy.”41
The new code resisted tradition and instead favored resolution on the
merits.42 The procedural gulf between pleading and trial was replaced by a
robust discovery phase; this new stage became the heart of litigation, as it

35. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 272 (1989).
36. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438 n.2 (2011);
Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA
L. REV. 1269, 1271 (1997).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 723(b)–(c) (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)); Clark,
supra note 32, at 436.
38. Clark & Moore, supra note 23, at 387.
39. See Clark, supra note 32, at 445–46. Clark thought criticism should come after, not
during, the moment of creation. Id.
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (amended 2007) (“There shall be one form of action to be
known as ‘civil action.’”).
41. Subrin, supra note 9, at 923–24; see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (1938) (amended 2007)
(“All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly,
severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any questions of law or fact common to all of
them will arise in the action.”).
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (1938) (amended 2007) (“A civil action is commenced by filing
a complaint with the court.”); id. 8(a) (“A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief . . . .”); id. 8(e)(1) (“Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.
No technical forms of pleading or motions are required.”); id. 12(b) (amended 1946, 1963,
2007) (“Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for a relief in any pleading . . . shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading . . . .”).
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permitted parties to scrutinize factual and legal assertions.43 The rules
challenged assumptions about judicial neutrality, permitting courts to shape
pretrial proceedings.44 A summary judgment motion allowed scrutiny of
factual allegations and afforded judges the authority to dismiss claims.45
Such a demanding process potentially facilitated informed settlement talks.
Trial by surprise gave way to a new regime that promoted factual
transparency and more searching trials.46 By 1938, the Supreme Court sent
this version to Congress, leading to the adoption of the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that would transform litigation.
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM
Civil procedure reform created the necessary impetus, and the potential
architecture, for the reform of criminal procedure. As with civil procedure,
states had made efforts to confront criticisms of the common law.47 But after
the transformation of civil litigation in 1938, House Representative Frances
Walter observed that congressional reform of criminal procedure was
virtually inevitable.48 He found allies in the U.S. Department of Justice.
Assistant Attorney General Brian McMahon testified that in some
jurisdictions, pleading technicalities might require a forty-page indictment.49
Former Attorney General Homer Cummings observed that a lack of statutory
43. See id. 26–31, 33–36, 45 (amended 2007). Clark’s views on civil procedure were
shaped by legal realism: his preference for data-driven judicial decisions led to his embrace
of, and advocacy for, a robust pretrial discovery period. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the
Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the
Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 80–89 (1989); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions
Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV.
691, 711 (1998); Subrin, supra note 9, at 967–68.
44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1938) (amended 2007).
45. See id. 56.
46. See id. 26, 30–36.
47. See, e.g., State v. Hliboka, 78 P. 965, 967 (Mont. 1904) (noting legislative efforts to
change civil and criminal pleading “to do away with the mere forms and technicalities of the
common law”); State v. Womack, 29 P. 939, 941 (Wash. 1892) (observing that recent
legislative efforts had sought to facilitate the use of a “plain statement” in pleading so as to
address the distortions to justice that resulted from “the technicalities and cobwebs and
mysticisms of the common law”). Initial reform efforts did not escape strict pleading formulas
but merely mitigated them. For example, as to indictments that required “an averment as to
money, or bullion or gold dust[,] . . . treasury notes or certificates, banknotes or other
securities[,] . . . checks, drafts[,] or bills of exchange,” the American Law Institute proposed
in 1931 that it should be sufficient to describe such things as “money, without specifying the
particular character, number, denomination, kind, species, or nature thereof.” State v. Peke,
371 P.2d 226, 232 (N.M. 1962).
48. See Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2, supra note 34, at 35.
Rep. Walter:
With the rules adopted in civil practice in the way they have
been we cannot, very well not enact this resolution.
Rep. Robinson:
That is because the civil rules have been so well received?
Rep. Walter:
Yes.
Rep. Robinson:
That this would follow along, yes; I think so.
Id.
49. Id. at 10.
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guidance on criminal procedure led to inconsistencies.50 Assistant Attorney
General Alexander Holtzoff emphasized the lack of uniformity.51 And New
York University Law Professor Arthur T. Vanderbilt told Congress that “the
system of criminal procedure is even more backward and primitive than has
been the case with civil procedure.”52 Consistent with the conclusions of
civil reformers, proponents of criminal procedure reform thought the
judiciary best suited to create rules of procedure.53 In 1940, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the American Law Institute, “I am hopeful
that the Congress will make provision for the regulation and simplification
of Federal criminal procedure by means of judicial rule making, similar to
that made by it several years ago in respect to Federal procedure.”54 That
year, Congress passed legislation that gave the Supreme Court authority to
draft rules of criminal procedure.55
The influence of civil procedure reform continued to be evident. The
Supreme Court delegated its drafting authority to a new advisory committee
to follow a course “so successfully employed by the earlier advisory
committee on Rules of Civil Procedure.”56 The Supreme Court appointed
Professor Vanderbilt as chairman,57 Professor James J. Robinson as reporter

50. Id. at 8.
51. Id. at 9 (citing Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879)). During the hearing, Holtzoff
read a passage penned by Supreme Court Justice Nathan Clifford:
Examined in the most favorable light, [criminal procedure] is a mere jumble of
Federal law, common law, and State law, consisting of incongruous and
irreconcilable regulations which, in legal effect, amount to no more than a direction
to the judge sitting in such a criminal trial to conduct the same as well as he can, in
view of the three systems of criminal jurisprudence.
Id. The rules of criminal procedure governing federal disputes in 1930 varied by jurisdiction.
See James J. Robinson, The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 27 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC’Y 38, 42 (1943). And the Conformity Act required federal courts to follow
common law rules unique to the state in which the federal court presided. See Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 2, supra note 34, at 4, 8. Federal courts were also subject to constitutional
constraints and a few federal statutes that affected “joinder of counts in an indictment; the
effect of a judgment on demurrer; procedure in removal hearings; the issuance of search
warrants and similar narrow procedural provisions.” Id. at 8.
52. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2, supra note 34, at 2.
53. See id. at 8–9, 16, 23. Foreshadowing disagreements unique to criminal reform, some
commentators raised concerns that shifting rulemaking authority to courts risked disrupting
prosecutorial power. Id. at 16, 23.
54. Homer Cummings, The New Criminal Rules—Another Triumph of the Democratic
Process, 31 A.B.A. J. 236, 238 (1945).
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 687 (1940) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
56. Dession, supra note 34, at 695.
57. Register of the Arthur T. Vanderbilt Political, Professional, and Judicial Papers,
1902–1957, WESLEYAN U., https://www.wesleyan.edu/libr/schome/FAs/VA1000-186.xml
[https://perma.cc/T8GF-JM6U] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017); see also Jim H. Smith, Arthur T.
Vanderbilt II ‘72: The Legacy of His Grandfather—and of Professor Clement Vose,
WESLEYAN MAG. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://magazine.wesleyan.edu/2014/12/10/arthur-tvanderbilt-ii-72-the-legacy-of-his-grandfather-and-of-professor-clement-vose
[https://perma.cc/AV5P-TED9]. Vanderbilt was a descendent of magnate Cornelius, “The
Commodore.” See Anne Chisholm, More Money Than Anyone Else, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24,
1989),
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/24/books/more-money-than-anyone-else.html
[https://perma.cc/HR72-52EV].
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and special assistant to the U.S. Attorney General’s Office, and Alexander
Holtzoff as secretary.58
A. The First Draft: A Unified Code of Procedure
In February of 1941, Reporter James Robinson and his staff began working
up the first draft of criminal procedure.59 Robinson served as a prosecutor
and was on active duty with the U.S. Navy before joining academia.60 The
year before he was appointed to be reporter, Robinson served as chairman of
the American Bar Association’s section of criminal law. In this role, he
advocated for the A.B.A. to “exert a serious leadership against crime and for
common sense and efficiency in criminal law administration.”61 Robinson’s
staff was filled with members of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Offices
of the Assistant U.S. Attorney, and the National Association of U.S.
Attorneys.62 Over the course of six months, Robinson and his team made a
crucial decision: the organization and content of the draft would be anchored
in the newly reformed civil rules.
In moving toward a unified code, Robinson’s team acknowledged the
diversity of possible approaches. To each proposed rule, the team considered
laws, standards, and commentary. The first draft, for example, proposed a
rule that required civil and criminal rules to be interpreted in the same way;
to this rule, the committee appended Federal Judge W. Calvin Chestnut’s
comments in opposition, as well as comments in support from the Judicial
58. See Judge Matthew F. McGuire, Judge Alexander Holtzoff—A Vignette, D.C. B.J.,
Mar.–Sept. 1973, at 17. Serving the committee in nonleadership positions were former New
York Court of Appeals Judge Frederick E. Crane and Federal District Judge Hugh D.
McClellan; attorneys George Z. Medalie, Leland Tolman, Gordon E. Dean, G. Aaron
Youngquist, George J. Burke, George F. Longsdorf, Murray Seasongood, and J.O. Seth; and
law professors Sheldon Glueck (Harvard), George H. Dession (Yale), Herbert Wechsler
(Columbia), John Barker Waite (University of Michigan), and Lester B. Orfield (University
of Nebraska). Dession, supra note 34, at 695 n.9.
59. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The New Federal Criminal Rules, 51 YALE L.J. 719, 720 (1942)
(“[T]he Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure commenced its work in
February, 1941 . . . .”).
60. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2, supra note 34, at 35; Leon H. Wallace, Dedication:
James J. Robinson, 50 IND. L.J. 648, 648 (1974); Indiana Governor Is After Vigilantes, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1921, at 2; James J. Robinson Dies, Libyan High Court Judge, WASH. POST
(May 25, 1980), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1980/05/25/james-jrobinson-dies-libyan-high-court-judge/3d005f12-b648-4b46-8c25-3d621a7c481d/
[https://perma.cc/7XA7-872V]. Robinson would later serve as a prosecutor in the Tokyo war
crimes trials after World War II. The People of the IMTFE, U. VA. L. LIBR. ,
http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/people#2326 [https://perma.cc/X3M7-JNGC] (last visited Oct.
16, 2017).
61. James J. Robinson, Report of the Chairman, A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. L. PROGRAM & COMM.
REP., July 1939, at 10, 14.
62. Robinson, supra note 51, at 44. In fact, the majority of Supreme Court Justices at that
time had previously served the in Department of Justice, including Justices Felix Frankfurter,
Charles Hughes, James McReynolds, Stanley Reed, Owen Roberts, and Harlan Stone. See
TOM W. CAMPBELL, FOUR SCORE FORGOTTEN MEN: SKETCHES OF JUSTICES OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT 333, 364–65, 381 (1950); PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR AND OFFICERS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, NOVEMBER 4, 1949, at 95 (1950); Charles C.
Burlingham, Harlan Fiske Stone, 32 A.B.A. J. 322, 323 (1946); Note, Mr. Justice Reed—
Swing Man or Not?, 1 STAN L. REV. 714, 715 (1949).
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Conference of the Fifth Circuit and the Committee for the Southern District
of Florida, which had no objection to the “Uniformity of Criminal Procedure
with Civil Procedure.”63 As to proposed rules that provided for pretrial
conferences and discovery, the draft included an assistant U.S. attorney’s
comment that a prosecutor should not be required to “disclose information
that might be harmful to the trial of the government case”64 and also included
comments in support of permitting a judge to hold pretrial conferences65 and
providing depositions to defendants.66
The legal and political environment appeared amenable to integrating the
substantive innovations of civil procedure reform.67 President Roosevelt
thought reform of criminal procedure should look to civil reform, as it had
been “met with general acclaim.”68 Professor Jerome Hall, a preeminent
scholar of criminal procedure, provided a comprehensive justification for a
unified code in his 1942 article in the Yale Law Journal.69 For Hall, civil
reform had been responsive to procedure’s universal purpose: to discover
relevant information, fulfill the promise of substantive law, assess whether a
defendant was liable under that law and, if so, to what degree.70 Hall viewed
the civil code as a compendium of neutral rules and saw no reason that
criminal litigation should not be subject to such treatment.71 “In general, as
regards the purely technical rules, those that are neutral as to advantage, the
new civil rules are always suggestive and sometimes can be applied almost
literally to criminal procedure.”72 Hall highlighted the major innovations of
civil rules—notice pleading, judicial management, and discovery—but found
existing features of criminal procedure “primitive” by comparison.73 For
Hall, civil and criminal disputes shared similar challenges and were
accordingly susceptible to a similar solution.
63. Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure
for the District Courts of the United States r. 2 note (Sept. 8, 1941) [hereinafter 1941 Draft
Rules of Criminal Procedure] (tentative draft) (on file with author).
64. Id. r. 16 note (comments of Alexander Campbell, U.S. attorney for the Northern
District of Indiana).
65. Id. (comments of the Committee for the District of Kansas) (suggesting that “the
principle of pre-trial should be applied in criminal cases if that can be done without violating
the Constitution”); see also id. (comments of the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit).
66. Id. r. 26.
67. Meanwhile, other commentators were alarmed by the widespread debate, arguing, for
instance, that “the task of reforming civil procedure should be sharply distinguished from the
task of improving criminal procedure” and that “[t]his distinction is not usually recognized.”
Comment, Reform in Criminal Procedure, 50 YALE L.J. 107, 108 n.8 (1940).
68. Id. (“It is hoped this grant of power will result in introducing uniformity and simplicity
in the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts and eliminating some of the
archaic technicalities which at times hamper or delay the progress of cases through the
courts. . . . The Rules of Civil Procedure have met with general acclaim and have made an
important contribution to reducing law’s delays and diminishing the cost of litigation. It is
reasonable to expect a similar result in criminal cases from the legislation just enacted.”
(alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.L.W. 2032 (1940)).
69. See Hall, supra note 7, at 739.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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Consistent with Hall’s views, Robinson’s team, apparently with Chairman
Vanderbilt’s support, integrated civil rules into its first draft.74 Robinson
wrote that in this draft the “criminal rules follow as closely as possible in
organization, in numbering and in substance the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”75 Indeed, the draft tracks the civil code’s organization, with
sections including scope, commencement, pleadings and motions, parties,
discovery, and so forth.76 Similar to civil litigants entering unfamiliar
territory with the introduction of the new civil procedure code, criminal law
practitioners would view this new ordering as a radical departure from
existing conceptions.77
Though Robinson’s team integrated the majority of civil rules, they
excepted those deemed incompatible with criminal disputes.78 The staff did
not include civil rules like interpleader, class actions, and summary
judgment.79 Any correspondence from Robinson explaining the basis for
these omissions was not found. He may have concluded that interpleader or
class action rules were inapplicable where the pleading party is always a
single entity (such as the state),80 and he may have determined summary
74. On the first day of the full committee, Chairman Vanderbilt said,
I think the notion of keeping the parallel numbering of the two sets of rules, civil
and criminal, is a splendid one. I have a doubt in my own mind as to how it is going
to work out, whether it may not mean too much warping and twisting of our rule,
but I think we can start with it tentatively and see how it materializes.
Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, United States
Supreme Court at 17 (Sept. 8–10, 1941) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Hearing] (on file
with author).
75. Id. at 5.
76. See generally 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63.
77. Charles Clark, in his approach to the civil rules, wrote “[e]xperience teaches us,
that . . . the general professional reaction is, quite naturally, against change . . . .” Clark &
Moore, supra note 23, at 390. Indicative of this resistance to change, during the first day of
the full committee’s meeting, member Sheldon Glueck continually expressed his discomfort
with the first draft’s departure from the structure of the common law. See Advisory Committee
Hearing, supra note 74, at 17, 257. For example, Mr. Glueck suggested, “I think that most of
us visualize this whole business as an orderly process, having certain traditional steps, and I
think it might help if . . . some stress were placed on a chronological order of the subjects.” Id.
at 257. Committee member Crane responded that he agreed, but Holtzoff disagreed, saying,
“I do not think, when we have the final draft, we need follow the numbering of the civil rules.”
Id.
78. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 4; see also 1941 Draft Rules of
Criminal Procedure, supra note 63 (letter from James J. Robinson to members of the advisory
committee).
79. For example, the civil rule for interpleader (in which an interested third party may join
as a plaintiff in the litigation) was not included, as only the government has the power to bring
a criminal case. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 457. Class actions permit
a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit and represent similarly harmed but unnamed plaintiffs against a
single defendant. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
80. The author was unable to locate correspondence or transcripts of meetings that might
reveal the particular reasons why Robinson and his staff rejected certain rules. There could
be many other reasons to exclude class actions: they usually are brought against the
government for the violation of civil rights, or, otherwise, are brought against companies in
mass tort cases. In a criminal case against a corporation, there is little to stop a prosecutor
from bringing multiple counts against a single corporate defendant for harming multiple
victims. Those victims might elect to bring a class action in a civil lawsuit for monetary
damages and any injunctive relief. In any case, subsequent Supreme Court decisions requiring
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judgment was precluded by a defendant’s right to a jury trial.81 Robinson
also made adjustments to some civil rules. For example, Robinson resisted a
full embrace of notice pleading; instead, he thought that a prosecutor should
provide a defendant a minimum threshold of notice of the charges.82
Robinson also preserved common law constraints on joinder, as opposed to
civil procedure’s more permissive stance.83
With these notable caveats, the first draft moved toward a unified code:
there was a “fundamental principle” that guided the first draft, “that is, to
follow as closely as possible the organization and so far as possible the
content of the civil rule in preparing [each] criminal rule.”84 Given the
receptivity to civil reform, Robinson thought tethering criminal and civil
rules would confer legitimacy to criminal process:
In the first place, the civil rules, as we know, have won a deserved prestige.
There is no reason why the criminal rules might not well follow as closely
as possible the plan and content of the civil rules and in that way gain some
of the same confidence which has been afforded the civil rules.85

individualization of criminal lawsuits would be in agreement with the committee’s exclusion
of the class action from the criminal code. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in
Criminal Cases, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 393 (2007) (“Aggregation remains a largely unused
method of criminal adjudication in the United States. Where core individual rights are at stake
in criminal trials, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that every criminal defendant
deserves an individual ‘day in court.’ The Court has accordingly developed a rigid set of rights
that appear to preclude any significant aggregation of criminal cases.”). This does not mean
that aggregation in criminal law cases might always be inappropriate; as Garrett observes, it
might be appropriate for defendants in a postconviction context to bring a class action against
the state. See id. Garrett’s observations also highlight the porous nature of criminal and civil
procedure—in Wisconsin, for example, a postconviction criminal claim is considered a civil
remedy. See, e.g., State v. Russo, No. 2009AP187, 2010 WL 1542426, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App.
Apr. 20, 2010). To certify a prosecutor as a class representative would provide an end-run
around the requirement that every element of every allegation be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362–63 (1970), and would violate a defendant’s right
to confront witnesses, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51 (2004).
81. A civil litigant is also entitled to a jury trial through the Seventh (as opposed to the
Sixth) Amendment. Recent scholarship calls into question the constitutionality of the
summary judgment’s use in civil litigation because it derogates a civil party’s jury right. See,
e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 140
(2007); cf. Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the Constitutionality of Summary
Judgment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 1 (2014). Taking a different approach, Carrie Leonetti
has proposed why a “defensive summary judgment” motion might be appropriate in criminal
litigation. Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes: A Proposal for Defensive
Summary Judgment in Criminal Cases, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 670 (2011).
82. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 8. For a full discussion
of this rule, see infra Part III.B.
83. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 20. Common law rules
governing joinder in criminal disputes had gradually become less strict. For instance, by 1918,
joinder permitted several criminal defendants to be joined in the same indictment so long as
they “join in the commission of an offense, whether it be a felony or a misdemeanor, . . . and
one or all may be convicted.” CLARK, supra note 12, at 347.
84. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 4; see also 1941 Draft Rules of
Criminal Procedure, supra note 63 (letter from James J. Robinson to members of the advisory
committee).
85. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 4.
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Robinson also recognized that legal assistance available to criminal
defendants was suboptimal. He envisioned a unified code providing a bridge
between poor criminal defendants and better-resourced firms in civil
litigation. A unified code would erode perceived barriers to entry and expose
criminal disputes to a larger market of litigators:
I think it is the object of all of us to attract into the practice in criminal cases
as many as possible of the lawyers whose practice frequently is exclusively
on the civil side. It would seem that it would be some contribution toward
that end if the criminal rules can be made as closely as possible like the
civil rules.86

Robinson was aware that civil procedure reform, in encouraging factual
development and transparency, would disrupt the existing balance of power
between the prosecutor and the defendant and would alter the existing roles
of litigants in a criminal dispute. Yet Robinson was also aware that
maintaining parallelism between civil and criminal procedure was a
historically rooted approach, that the civil rules had been well received, and
that Congress and the executive had instructed the committee to look to civil
rules for guidance. In his correspondence to the full committee, Robinson
emphasized, “I want you to understand that this draft has been prepared with
the idea of carrying that parallelism [to civil rules] as far as possible . . . .”87
He encouraged members to offer “full and free criticism.”88 He was likely
surprised at how fully and freely it came from one member, Alexander
Holtzoff, who would prove to be the tip of the spear, if not the spear itself, in
vanquishing Robinson’s vision.89
B. The Full Committee Considers a Unified Code
The full committee met on September 8, 1941.90 The work of Robinson
and his staff, which took six months to construct, was undone in four days.
The transcripts of these first few meetings reveal how criminal procedure was
severed from civil procedure, but they also indicate that the outcome was not
inevitable. James Robinson did not face a committee inherently opposed to
his vision, but rather faced a powerful spokesperson who was wedded to
existing practices and institutional norms: Alexander Holtzoff. Holtzoff
dominated meetings, voicing his opinion on the first page and most of the
800 pages that follow.91 He frequently attempted to frame the issue and guide
the discussion on each rule, ready to offer a counterproposal that altered and
often discarded the proposed civil rule.
Though Holtzoff’s justifications for his positions were highly variable and
sometimes self-contradictory, a pattern emerged: he preferred existing
common law practices over civil rules, unless the civil rule better facilitated

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1.
See id.
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prosecution. Robinson soon identified this pattern, even as Holtzoff raised
other reasons to reject a civil rule. For example, when Holtzoff objected to
the imposition of written pleas because doing so would undermine a
defendant’s right to make an oral plea, Robinson suspected that a different
motive—prosecutorial efficiency—was at play: “We want, of course, these
rules to be fair to the Government. At the same time they must be fair to the
defendant. We must have a balance between the two. I think we all agree
we do not want just speedy and quick convictions.”92
As the first day of the full committee meeting progressed and Holtzoff
resolutely engaged with each proposed rule, Robinson voiced his concerns
that the effort to achieve parallelism was being frustrated. “If we begin to
leave a thing out as dealt with in the civil rules at one point and proceed to
make our own rearrangement, we are going to get pretty far away from our
plan of holding the two systems of rules pretty closely together.”93 In fact,
Robinson’s edifice had sustained significant damage within the first hour,
given that the committee rejected the proposed rule that would have anchored
the criminal rules to the civil rules: the conformity rule. Once this rule was
defeated, the parallelism envisioned by the first draft began to unravel.
1. The Conformity Rule (Proposed Rule 2)
The first draft opened with a conformity rule, the heart of a unified code:
Each of these Rules of Criminal Procedure which duplicates or which
corresponds to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure bears the same rule
number as the civil rule which it duplicates or to which it corresponds in
title or in function. The procedure under these rules is designed to conform
as closely as possible to the procedure under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and these rules shall be construed with that purpose in view.94

Robinson attempted not only to duplicate the civil code’s content but also
to tie the interpretation of the criminal code to the civil code. Under this rule,
civil and criminal litigators would look across a more transsubstantive
plane.95 This rule would constrain courts from distinguishing criminal from

92. Id. at 90–91.
93. Id. at 99. The author has not yet determined to what plan Robinson referred—such
as, for example, any discussions he had with principal committee members before he and his
staff drafted the first set of rules.
94. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 2.
95. David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU
L. REV. 1191, 1207–08 (“For some species of process law, trans-substantivity has long served
as a central principle of doctrinal design. This is so for evidence law. Trans-substantivity’s
persistence reflects the long-held belief, voiced prominently by John Henry Wigmore, that
‘there is no occasion’ in evidence law ‘for a distinction’ among various types of cases.”
(footnotes omitted) (quoting 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 4 (1904))); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in
Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215,
228 (1987) (“To fulfill its role in our legal system, procedure strives for fairness and efficiency.
In a fair and efficient procedural system, the principal and valued features are accuracy in factfinding and rule application, minimum cost in both time and expense to the parties and the
court system, and predictability for the participants. These goals in turn support the
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civil disputes and would prohibit courts from looking to other sources of law
in interpreting the meaning of criminal rules. The first civil discovery rules,
for example, permitted parties to request documents “material” to the case—
the conformity rule would hitch the criminal code’s use of “material” to its
meaning in the civil code.96
Because Chairman Vanderbilt instructed the committee to address each
rule in seriatim, the committee had addressed the most sweeping,
controversial rule first—the conformity rule. Holtzoff announced it “would
be dangerous to tie” the two codes together, as other members raised more
measured concerns.97 Professor Sheldon Glueck worried about adopting the
civil code’s structure itself; he thought doing so would entail “too great [a]
warping” of a criminal case’s existing chronology.98 Professor Herbert
Wechsler wondered whether policies animating criminal and civil law were
too different to share the same procedural backbone.99 Attorney George Z.
Medalie observed that criminal courts had permitted some informality to
persist and worried that tying criminal rules to civil rules might end this
implicit agreement.100 With these unanswered questions hanging in the
balance, Holtzoff nevertheless moved to strike the conformity rule,
contending that civil rules constituted a thicket of technicalities that would
undermine efficiency.101 His motion to cleave criminal from civil procedure
and send civil and criminal litigation on different paths for generations
carried without further discussion.102 This single, unexamined decision
permitted a wedge to be driven between the two codes.
In the absence of a conformity rule, courts interpreting criminal rules have
looked to other sources of law for guidance in interpreting rules of criminal
procedure, like postconviction standards, which typically impose quite
limited obligations on the state.103 In contrast, terms like “relevant” and
“material” that are used in civil procedure impute broad obligations.104 In
the conformity rule’s absence, courts have explicitly adopted prudential
principles that widen the procedural divide: “As a matter of general
development of trans-substantive procedure, for the substance-procedure dialectic involves
much more than simple considerations of substance over form.”).
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1938) (amended 2007) (“Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor and upon notice to all other parties . . . the court may order any party to permit
the inspection and copying of [documents] . . . not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in [the party’s]
possession, custody, or control.” (emphasis added)).
97. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 22.
98. Id. at 17. Chairman Vanderbilt thought it easy to integrate any procedures unique to
criminal cases within the civil code’s organization, satisfying Glueck. Id. at 17–18.
99. Id. at 18.
100. Id. at 22–23.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Bulger, 928 F. Supp. 2d 305, 324 (D. Mass. 2013); United
States v. Felt, 491 F. Supp. 179, 186 (D.D.C. 1979) (stating that materiality “has at times been
interpreted to track closely with the constitutional standard”).
104. See Jordan Gross, An Ounce of Pretrial Prevention Is Worth More Than a Pound of
Post-Conviction Cure: Untethering Federal Pretrial Criminal Procedure from Due Process
Standards of Review, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 317, 323 (2013).
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construction ‘[t]he measure of discovery permitted by the Rules of Criminal
Procedure is not intended to be as broad as in a civil case.’”105
Dissolving the conformity rule that would have bound the two codes left
Holtzoff free to pick and choose which civil rules to incorporate and how to
interpret them. Wechsler’s astute question regarding what policy objectives
should inform the construction of the code was left unanswered. In the
absence of an overarching set of objectives, the rule creation exercise risked
creating a code that favored one party over another. The committee
nevertheless moved on to the next set of proposed rules—the pleading rules.
2. Pleading
Under civil rules, once a plaintiff files a complaint, the clerk issues a
summons to be served on the defendant so as to provide notice of the
dispute.106 This simple arrangement was met with Holtzoff’s approval, as a
prosecutor might prefer the service of a complaint to the hassle of arrest.107
When others suggested inserting language into the summons that would
heighten notice, Holtzoff, having just portrayed the civil rules as a thicket of
technicalities, turned to them for cover, saying: “You do not have anything
like that in civil summons. I would like to see our criminal forms just as
simple, if possible,”108 and “I think the clarity with which the civil rules were
drawn is something to be admired.”109 Holtzoff did object to a provision
permitting a court to “direct the clerk to issue a summons” on the grounds
that such discretion should remain only with the prosecutor.110 Medalie
thought judicial temperance might control the worst urges of junior
prosecutors who were apt to “regard very petty offenses as being almost
capital offenses.”111 “Some person with experience,” he noted, “should be
with them to give them a word of caution.”112 However, Holtzoff thought
any concerns of overreaching were best dealt with internally by the
Department of Justice.113
A keystone of civil procedure reform was to replace technical pleading
requirements with “notice pleading.” Notice pleading resisted any particular
form and gave legs to potentially embryonic and murky allegations.114
Contrary to its label, notice pleading promised defendants significantly less
notice. Robinson attempted to find a middle ground, rejecting the formalized
and unyielding language of the common law but also building in a minimum

105. See United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 1975) (alteration in original)
(quoting Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901, 915 (5th Cir. 1968)).
106. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 4.
107. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 45–46.
108. Id. at 48.
109. Id. at 50.
110. Id. at 52.
111. Id. at 53.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 52.
114. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
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baseline of notice.115 Robinson defended his decision to deviate by a degree
from the civil standard: “You are stating the grounds for putting a man in the
penitentiary. There is nothing comparable to that in the civil rules.”116
Holtzoff disagreed and advocated for the full embrace of notice pleading,
again praising the civil code’s simplicity.117 Holtzoff thought that to “allege
that the defendant murdered John Smith by a fatal gunshot wound” would be
sufficient to advance to trial.118 With some concessions to Medalie and
Frederick E. Crane, who thought a prosecutor should at least provide a
“concise statement of facts,”119 Holtzoff persuaded others to adopt the civil
rule in this instance.120 Importing notice pleading into criminal procedure
had a significant consequence: it dramatically lowered the entrance fee for
the prosecutor.
The question then would be whether, in exchange for easing the
prosecutor’s burden to initiate litigation (and allowing less notice of the facts
of the dispute), Holtzoff would consider a discovery phase to permit a
defendant to review and test the factual basis for the state’s allegations.
Holtzoff would not. But before taking on the issue of discovery, the
committee turned to civil reform’s construction of a pretrial motion practice
that required written responses and deliberation, as opposed to existing
practices that had permitted oral and spontaneous motions to flourish.
3. Pretrial Motion Practice
The civil rules required written motions and notice of hearings, informing
parties of the content of any motion and granting an opportunity to respond
in writing and be heard.121 To Holtzoff, these requirements threatened to
delay proceedings and impede prosecution.122 Holtzoff observed that rural
courts ran through a docket in three days (day one, indictments; day two,
115. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 8. Proposed Rule 8
called for a “plain and concise statement” of (1) the court’s jurisdiction, (2) the source of the
accusation (i.e., grand jury), (3) the defendant’s name, (4) the time of the offense, (5) the place
of offense, (6) the act or omission that constitutes the offense, (7) any criminal intent, (8) the
name of victim, (9) any other essential facts that provide important notice to defendant, and
(10) the statute violated. Id. The proposed rule further stated that “[n]o formal or additional
allegations are required.” Id.
116. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 218.
117. Id. at 207.
118. Id. at 201.
119. Id. at 202, 205. At the hearing, Medalie concurred that using the language “a concise
statement of facts constituting the offense” was sufficient. Id. at 206. Crane and Medalie’s
suggestion was aimed at preventing an automatic filing of a bill of particulars that would
require a concise set of facts anyway. Id.
120. Holtzoff stated, “We could adopt that language and require a short and plain statement
of facts constituting the offense with which the defendant is charged.” Id. at 207. Holtzoff
may have added the last part—a short and plain statement of facts—to placate a member who
advocated for such a rule. In addition, Medalie thought a defendant should have some notice
of the actual statute he allegedly violated; his wishes would be reflected in the resulting code.
Id. at 211–12. The chairman by fiat ultimately adopted Holtzoff’s version. Id. at 219.
121. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 6(d)–(e).
122. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 110. This suggestion seemed to
undermine one of the only explicit goals of the committee—to achieve a set of uniform rules.
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pleas; day three, any trials) and did not reconvene for three months.123 He
proposed leaving it to individual jurisdictions to impose or waive these
requirements. Here, Holtzoff sacrificed uniformity for efficiency. When J.O.
Seth wondered why a person indicted on a Monday should be convicted on
Tuesday, Holtzoff maintained that accelerated dispositions protected
defendants; otherwise, a defendant “might have to languish in jail for two or
three months until the next term of court.”124 Seth found this feature of the
system unacceptable, but Holtzoff assured him that Congress was “perfectly
satisfied with” these circumstances.125
Holtzoff also objected to a rule that all parties should be notified of any
written motion.126 Though asserting a prosecutor should always receive
notice, Holtzoff thought it the responsibility of codefendants to stay updated
by reading local law journals. Robinson worried that the failure to be
informed of a hearing could harm a codefendant’s case and argued that all
civil litigants were entitled to notice. Holtzoff responded, “The civil rules
are so different from criminal prosecutions . . . . A civil case is a controversy
between two private individuals, which is different from criminal
procedure.”127 This observation seemed to support Robinson’s view that a
criminal defendant who faced a loss of liberty should receive at least the same
notice as a civil defendant. But perhaps Holtzoff meant that a prosecutor, as
minister of justice, would ensure that a hearing would be fair to all, rendering
notice to codefendants unnecessary. Holtzoff’s motion to strike the “notice
of hearing” provision was met with a sea of ayes.128
Holtzoff also objected to a provision giving the court the power to require
that notice be sent to all parties.129 Holtzoff presumably viewed this
arrangement as an unnecessary erosion of prosecutorial power. Vanderbilt
agreed with Holtzoff for other reasons. He thought that a judge serving a
short term should not make procedural decisions that would outlast his
tenure.130 Robinson pushed back: “When a man’s life or liberty is at stake,
I do not think we ought to take [matters of judicial administration] into
consideration.”131 Holtzoff responded, “We have to take the courts as we
find them.”132 Robinson fired back, “We have to take the rights of defendants

123. Id. at 109.
124. Id. at 110.
125. Id. at 111.
126. Id. at 90–92; see also 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 5(a).
127. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 93.
128. Id. at 96.
129. Holtzoff was frequently on the alert for any language that indicated that a matter would
proceed “by leave of court.” For example, in proposed Rule 7(a)(1), if a defendant waived his
right to an indictment, then “the attorney for the government may by leave of court proceed
against the accused by information, or complaint.” 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure,
supra note 63, r. 7(a)(1). Holtzoff sought to leave this matter purely in the hands of the
prosecutor. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 147.
130. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 97–98.
131. Id. at 97.
132. Id.
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as we find them.”133 Holtzoff’s view, however, resonated with the majority
of members.
As to the civil rule’s requirement that motions actually be in writing,
Holtzoff thought doing so put oral motions under a cloud of illegitimacy.134
Said Holtzoff, “I think that criminal practice is much more informal than civil
procedure, and I do not think we want to make it any more formal or any
more difficult. I think our aim should be to simplify it rather than to
complicate it.”135 Medalie agreed, asking, “What is the harm in granting
motions without papers?” to which Holtzoff answered, “None at all.”136 To
Holtzoff, even a rule that required a uniform caption page was
objectionable—it signaled approval of a written tradition. Holtzoff stated,
“You do not need all that formality with papers in a criminal case. . . . [W]e
do not want to inject technicalities and formalities that do not now exist.”137
Robinson bristled, “Do not let us use epithets like ‘technicalities and
formalities.’”138 Where Robinson saw these civil rules provide notice and
deliberation, Holtzoff saw new fronts open up for judicial incursion,
distraction, and delay.139
4. Judicial Management of Pretrial Disputes
Reform to civil procedure challenged assumptions about judicial neutrality
by inviting a judge to put a thumb on a pretrial scale.140 By emboldening the
judge, the civil rules built in a control rod to its new creation: a party-driven
system that afforded litigants with discovery powers, which could be misused
133. Id.
134. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 7. Under proposed Rule
7(b)(1), “[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made
during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing” and “shall state with particularity the
grounds therefor.” Id.
135. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 179–80. Holtzoff would later write
that common law pleading practice in the criminal law was formal and technical, as it required
“useless and laborious learning” and “an incalculable amount of midnight oil” to solve the
“futile problem of how an indictment should be drawn and what it should contain.” Alexander
Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119, 124 (1944).
136. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 180.
137. Id. at 181–82.
138. Id. at 182.
139. See id.; see also 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 16.
140. See Charles E. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 163–
64 (1956) (noting that, following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Rule 16 in particular, “[p]re-trial procedure in this country came into its own,” giving the rules
“wide appeal” and animating the “objectives of pre-trial”). Presently, Rule 16(a) provides that
the court “may order the attorneys” to appear for the purposes of “(1) expediting disposition
of the action; (2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be
protracted because of lack of management; (3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; (4)
improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation; and (5) facilitating
settlement.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a). Furthermore, Rule 16(b)(3) requires a court to issue a
scheduling order that controls the litigation and investigation, and Rule 16(c)(2) permits the
court to simplify issues, eliminate claims or defenses, amend pleadings, obtain stipulations as
to facts and admissibility, avoid unnecessary proof, determine the appropriateness of summary
judgment, manage discovery and disclosures, identify witnesses and important documents,
and set dates for discovery. Id. 16(b)–(c).
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to harass opponents and delay proceedings. An empowered judge could play
referee and intervene.141 Charles Clark viewed judicial management as
critical to individualizing a case, “so that [the case] may be separated for its
own particular treatment from the vast grist of cases passing through our
courts in daily routine toward negotiation and settlement and, occasionally,
trial.”142 In attending to the need for efficiency, civil reformers considered
what was lost by the mass processing of cases and sought to insert mitigation
measures. Clark’s observation exemplified a deep concern to achieve
balance between competing aims of reform.
The first draft of criminal procedure also envisioned judges climbing down
into the pretrial trenches.143 Holtzoff viewed this as a threat to prosecutorial
discretion, and he was not alone. Medalie said, “I wonder how United States
attorneys feel about this,” underscoring a sense of prosecutorial entitlement
to pretrial territory.144 Committee members doubted that a judge would
demand a pretrial conference in the absence of prosecutorial consent, and one
member could not believe that a judge would tell a U.S. attorney to appear
just so the judge could exert influence.145 The few civil litigators in the room
disagreed—a judge could do exactly that.146 To this, even Robinson was
skeptical: “I doubt if the judge would do much of that in a criminal case.”147
Medalie agreed, responding “No; [the judges would] not do it.”148 Still,
Holtzoff thought ceding control to the court was ill-advised; a prosecutor
should not “lose control of the calendar.”149
Medalie also concluded that conferring power to a judge would be “a large
profit . . . to the defendant.”150 Endemic of the committee’s failure to view
each rule in isolation, the committee’s discussion of judicial incursion in
pretrial proceedings was not anchored to any discussion of discovery. Yet,
in the absence of discovery, any concern about judicial overreaching would
be rendered moot. The committee amended the rule to permit a judge to
invite parties for a pretrial consultation, to which a party could decline; later,
the provision would be excised altogether.151 As a result, where civil rules
establish a court’s “early and continuing control” of a case, criminal rules
today provide for no pretrial judicial management.152 Consistent with

141. See Clark, supra note 140, at 164.
142. Id.
143. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 16.
144. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 374.
145. See id. at 375.
146. See id. at 375–76.
147. Id. at 375.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 376.
150. Id. at 391.
151. The Supreme Court, in its final review of the proposed rules, would jettison the rule
altogether.
152. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(2); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1 (providing the closest analogue to
present-day Rule 16(a)(2)). Rule 17.1 limits the court’s discretion to discussing a pretrial
hearing only to “promote a fair and expeditious trial.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1. Thus, it is rarely
relevant and narrow in scope.
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Holtzoff’s stated objectives, prosecutors now fill that vacuum and maintain
control over the course of criminal cases.
5. Discovery
Under common law, the pretrial exchange of information was exceptional.
Civil reform turned this exception into the rule. Civil reform introduced a
new phase and changed the deep structure of litigation to pleading, discovery,
and trial.153 To civil reformers, the rules created a system of checks and
balances, with the discovery phase as the constant point of reference.154
Without this phase, notice pleading provided too much leniency, and the
objectives of individualizing lawsuits, exploring the merits, and preventing
surprise at trial remained unfulfilled.
The first draft of criminal procedure adopted the civil discovery phase
almost whole cloth, integrating depositions, document requests, physical and
mental examinations, and requests for admission.155 The draft included a
rule giving a defendant the power to depose witnesses and permitted the
defendant to ask questions “relevant to the subject matter.”156 Meanwhile,
the rule conditioned the government’s right to take a deposition on a
defendant deposing a “prospective witness for the government.”157
Suggestions from the legal community revealed support for affording
deposition power to criminal defendants. For instance, representatives from
the State Bar Association of Kansas thought that a defendant should be
“permitted to take depositions on notice to the United States attorney ‘in the
same manner as provided in the rules of civil procedure.’”158
The committee’s discussion of this rule revealed fears that a defendant
would use the deposition power to leave for China at the government’s
expense and refuse to return, forcing extradition.159 In addition to worries
about jailbreaks and witnesses relocating to Shanghai, some thought a
defendant would misuse depositions to cause delay, while others worried that
the government would misuse depositions to circumvent the Confrontation
Clause.160 Some members thought that a deposition was only a vehicle to
secure trial testimony, not a tool to investigate or test the credibility of an
153. See supra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
155. 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 26–32 (depositions); id. r.
34 (document requests); id. r. 35 (physical and mental examinations); id. r. 36 (requests for
admissions). Without explanation, interrogatories were excluded on the ground that such a
tool could not be used in criminal proceedings. Id. r. 33 (“No criminal rule is proposed which
is comparable to Civil Rule 33.”).
156. Id. r. 26.
157. Id.
158. 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 26 note.
159. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 418–19. Crane, after discussing his
concern about the defendant attempting to stay wherever he travelled to participate in the
deposition, stated, “I should think he would be delighted to go [to China], as he gets out of jail
and has a joy-ride and takes his lawyer along at the expense of his Government.” Id. at 419.
160. Id. at 419–20. Some worried that the government would overuse depositions, though
as Medalie pointed out, “Practically . . . the Government can examine anybody it wants to after
indictment and before trial on whatever pretext it has.” Id. at 452.
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opponent’s witnesses. “Why should the defendant take the deposition of a
witness who is likely to be a witness for the Government?” asked Holtzoff.
He thought instead that “[t]he defendant would take the deposition of a
witness who is likely to be a witness for himself.”161 Robinson pushed back,
arguing that a defendant “wants to know what he is going to have to meet in
court.”162 Medalie thought that if a witness is going to be available for trial,
“there is no case made, under any principle of justice, for the taking of the
deposition in advance of the trial, unless you want to try the whole case by
deposition.”163 Robinson explained that in civil cases, “You want to find out
what the other side is going to do on the trial.”164 But Crane retorted, “[T]hat
is the trouble. I think you have the idea of civil practice injected into the
criminal procedure.”165 “To . . . go into the other side’s case to examine
anybody . . . before trial,” he noted, “is a thing you would never think of in a
criminal case.”166
This exchange revealed that members, though seemingly aligned with
Holtzoff, might have accepted the proposed rule. When Wechsler expressed
that the deposition rule as drafted was too disjointed,167 Medalie proposed
the committee adopt the civil rule by reference.168 Robinson, rather than
embrace an ally, took a self-defeating approach to express his brewing
frustration and reminded Medalie that the committee had decided against
referencing civil rules when it rejected the conformity rule.169 Medalie
turned to Robinson:
You talk very earnestly about having lawyers who do civil work do work
in criminal cases. I think that is a futile hope of yours, because of the
mystery connected with criminal cases. Still, I think it is a mighty good
thing to have procedure the same in both branches of trial and litigated
practice wherever possible; and here for the first time we have a definite
opportunity to make the things about the same.170

This was the first time that Medalie explicitly supported the integration of
key civil rules. The moment demonstrated Medalie’s political skills: he
expressed skepticism at the enterprise of a unified code while he advocated
for the implementation of a paradigm-shifting civil rule. Crane also seemed
willing to import this centerpiece of civil reform, urging the committee to
simplify the rules or just “[r]efer to the civil rules.”171 The issue, however,
was tabled, and Holtzoff would volunteer himself to assist with the next draft
of the rules. The committee ultimately considered, after Holtzoff’s
redrafting, a diluted deposition right; the revised rule limited the use of
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 447.
Id.
Id. at 450–51.
Id. at 452.
Id.
Id. at 453.
See id. at 456–57.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 462.
Id.
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depositions to prevent “a failure or delay of justice.”172 In subsequent drafts,
erosion of the rule continued and, when the committee’s final draft was
submitted to Congress in 1944, depositions were limited to those rare
instances in which a witness would not be available for trial, a standard that
effectively removed from criminal disputes the most powerful tool of pretrial
investigation.173
The first draft of criminal procedure also permitted document requests;
specifically, upon a showing of good cause, the court could “order any party
to produce and permit the inspection and copying” of documents or things
“not privileged” that were “material” to the case.174 In introducing the rule,
Robinson’s fatigue in swimming against the current was apparent:
Here again you see an effort has been made to present to you a rule which
would be adapted to criminal cases so far as possible in a comparative way
with the civil rule 34 applying to civil cases. Whether or not that is possible
or practicable is for your consideration. If you feel that discovery cannot
be used in criminal cases, you may indicate that.175

Holtzoff immediately moved to strike the rule, contending that this was “a
one-sided proposition” and asking, “Am I right that this could operate only
in favor of the defendant as against the Government and never in favor of the
Government as against the defendant, because the defendant could always
plead the privilege against self-incrimination?”176 Holtzoff instead proposed
a rule that would condition a defendant’s access to government documents
on a waiver of the self-incrimination privilege. G. Aaron Youngquist was
also opposed to the exchange of documents, as he suspected a defendant
would use such information to fabricate a defense: “If you disclose your
evidence to the defendant, it gives him, if he be that kind of person, an
opportunity to frame up a defense to meet it.”177
Here, Medalie again aligned himself with Robinson’s cause and, this time,
he dug in his heels. The resulting discussion was rich. To Holtzoff and
Youngquist, Medalie said, “the truth ought to have no favorites.”178 Holtzoff
responded:
This is not only a question of producing the truth at the trial. This is a way
of getting a discovery before the trial and preparing evidence to meet it
with, which means that unscrupulous defendants may fabricate evidence
with which to meet the evidence that the Government is going to introduce
at the trial.179

172. Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure
for the District Courts of the United States r. 57(a) (Jan. 12, 1942) [hereinafter 1942 Draft
Rules of Criminal Procedure] (tentative draft) (on file with author).
173. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (1944) (amended 1975, 1987, 2002, 2011).
174. 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 34.
175. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 465.
176. Id. at 465–66.
177. Id. at 466.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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Medalie was skeptical that a defendant could use government documents
to fabricate evidence and thought any such attempt would backfire and aid in
the conviction.180 Medalie indicated his comfort with constitutional
protections, and, while conceding that they had some cost to the government,
he thought that prosecutors would retain an advantage: “you are practicing
law now in criminal cases with that handicap for the Government.”181
Holtzoff replied, “This is not a question of concealing the truth. This is a
question as to whether or not the [prosecutor’s] evidence should be revealed
. . . before trial.”182 Medalie did not back down: “What harm is there in
knowing what the prosecutor knows? It is the truth.”183
Fellow committee member Gordon Dean agreed with Medalie, wondering
why a defendant should not have a chance, in advance of trial, to consider the
State’s evidence.184 Dean did not see a similar obligation on a defendant,
who did not have a burden at trial.185 Medalie asserted that a prosecutor
could, by any ready excuse, convene a grand jury to subpoena witnesses in
preparation for trial.186 But Holtzoff continued to protest that there could be
no discovery right afforded to a defendant in the absence of a reciprocal
obligation.187 Medalie observed that Holtzoff was battling “something that
is inherent in our whole system, and that is the privilege against selfincrimination.”188 Medalie also pointed out that Holtzoff drew all his
examples of perceived unfairness from corporate cases, where defendants
hold most of the evidence and which were not representative of the ordinary
cases in which the government has “far more than the defendant could
get.”189
Holtzoff moved to make a defendant’s request for documents conditional
on waiving the right to self-incrimination. This motion lost, though
Youngquist stated, “I vote ‘no’ because I think we should not [permit a
defendant access] at all,” to which Holzoff stated, “I am willing to go along
with that.”190 A chorus of nays followed a chorus of ayes, so that motion lost
as well.191 This standoff indicated that, with the leadership of a figure like
Medalie, the committee could be persuaded to accept a regime that had
concordance with the civil regime. The standoff also revealed Holtzoff’s
tenacity and singular purpose. The committee’s second draft would retain
the substance of Robinson’s proposal, but a “poison-pill” was added (likely
by Holtzoff, who after the first meeting was authorized to participate in
drafting), which read:
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 471.
Id. at 467.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 467–68.
Id.
Id. at 468.
See id. at 468–70.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 473.
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This rule is based on Civil Rule 34, but it is made considerably narrower
than the latter. The principal difference between the two is that in order to
meet the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination it contains an
express provision exempting the defendant from being required to produce
any document or object if he alleges that the contents may tend to
incriminate him. . . .
It appears to the draftsman that the rule is somewhat futile in criminal cases,
but is presented so that it may receive further consideration.192

To Holtzoff, losing an argument was a momentary loss in a greater war.
The final draft submitted to Congress more closely tracked Holtzoff’s
preference that a defendant receive nothing from the State. It only permitted
a defendant access to documents that had belonged to the defendant but had
been seized by the State—or, in other words, information of which the
defendant was already aware.193 Overall, the robust discovery regime
created in the first draft was severely curtailed.194 And due to this four-day
meeting in September 1941, a criminal defendant, initially given agency to
investigate and test the government’s case, was procedurally deemed a
passive recipient of information that would be managed by the prosecutor.195
C. A New Code Based on the Old Code
With Holtzoff’s influence, the second draft of criminal procedure hewed
closely to common law procedure as it integrated a few civil rules—borrowed
from rules of equity—that facilitated prosecution.196 In the introduction to
the second draft considered by the advisory committee, Robinson noted that
Holtzoff had “assisted in the revision of numerous rules,” attempting to keep

192. 1942 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 172, r. 56 note.
193. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (1944) (amended 1966, 1974, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1997,
2002, 2013).
194. Meyn, Discovery and Darkness, supra note 7, at 1101 (observing that discovery under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides only for limited disclosures).
195. See id.; see also 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 16.
196. This direction was consistent with the suggestions of Crane, Glueck, Holtzoff, and
Chairman Vanderbilt. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 257.
Mr. Glueck: I think that most of us visualize this whole business as an orderly
process, having certain traditional steps, and I think it might help
if . . . some stress were placed on a chronological order of the
subjects.
Mr. Crane:
I agree with that.
Mr. Holtzoff: I do not think, when we have the final draft, we need follow the
numbering of the civil rules.
Id. Vanderbilt expressed that the committee could rearrange the structure and, if need be,
reference any integration of the civil code to “accomplish what the reporter had in mind.” Id.
at 258. Compare CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (AM. LAW. INST. 1931) (structuring the Table
of Contents as: Arrest, Preliminary Examination, Bail, Grand Jury, Indictment and
Information, Arraignment, Pleas, Jurisdiction and Venue, Trial), with 1942 Draft Rules of
Criminal Procedure, supra note 172 (structuring the Table of Contents as: General Provisions;
Preliminary Warrant or Summons, Hearing, and Bail; Indictment and Information;
Arraignment, Pleas, Motions, and Notices; Trial).
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the rules brief and simple and “to facilitate the functioning of the trial as a
method for determining the truth about an issue which is in controversy.”197
This sixth draft was the first to be publicly distributed, and it bore little
relationship to civil procedure.198 Articles authored by committee members
that praised the reform were published contemporaneous with the draft’s
public debut.199 Robinson acknowledged that the committee had considered
civil procedure as a template, but as a team player, he portrayed civil reform
as incompatible. He wrote that the committee had determined that “the
possibilities of adapting the civil rules . . . as the basis or model of
organization or of content for the criminal rules were limited and
unpromising, except in isolated instances.”200 Meanwhile, Holtzoff’s
analysis was triumphant:
The principal significance of the new federal criminal rules is found in the
attempt to reform procedure and to make far-reaching improvements as
they appeared necessary. Existing procedure has been simplified and
numerous outmoded technicalities that originated several centuries ago
have been eliminated. Many of these technicalities were the culmination
of humanitarian efforts to ameliorate the rigors of the criminal law at a time
when it was almost savage in its ferocity. Today they are meaningless and
arouse risibility. The simplification of procedure has been accomplished,
however, without sacrifice of any safeguards that properly surround a
defendant in a criminal case. In fact, in some respects the new rules have
cemented and strengthened the protection accorded to the defendant.201

In December 1944, the rules of criminal procedure were sent to Congress
for authorization.202 The final draft retained common law’s deep structure of
pleading and trial. Yet the new code dramatically eased the prosecutor’s
journey from pleading to trial. The prosecutor now faced a forgiving
pleading standard, which only required a “plain, concise and definite written
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”203 The new
code adopted other equitable rules, including the liberal joinder of claims and
parties, which eased the prosecutor’s ability to consolidate felonies and
misdemeanors that were based on “transactions connected together or
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.”204 Rejecting a discovery
197. 1942 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 172 (letter from James J.
Robinson to members of the advisory committee).
198. See Holtzoff, supra note 135, at 123.
199. See generally id.; George F. Longsdorf, The New Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 18 J. ST. B. CAL. 263 (1943); Lester B. Orfield, The Preliminary Draft of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 22 TEX. L. REV. 37 (1943); Robinson, supra note 51, at
39, 44; Arthur T. Vanderbilt, New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure, 6 TEX. B.J. 300
(1943).
200. Robinson, supra note 51, at 43.
201. Holtzoff, supra note 135, at 123.
202. Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., to the
Honorable Francis Biddle, Attorney Gen. of the U.S. (Dec. 26, 1944), in 327 U.S. 823 (1945).
203. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) (1944) (amended 1966, 1972, 1979, 1987, 2000, 2002, 2009).
204. Id. 3 (amended 1972, 1993, 2002, 2011) (drafting the complaint); id. 4 (amended 1966,
1974, 1987, 1993, 2002, 2011) (serving the complaint); id. 8(a) (amended 2002) (“Two or
more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for
each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the
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phase, the final draft of criminal procedure preserved the pretrial lacuna
between pleading and trial that characterized common law disputes.
Depositions were limited to those rare instances in which trial testimony
would otherwise be lost.205
This absence of a discovery phase provided prosecutors with both frontend gains (given that the complaint required little, and a defendant had no
power to factually challenge the allegations) and back-end gains (given that
the prosecutor could motivate a plea through the strategic release of
information and an inflated trial threat, as the prosecutor remained fairly
insulated from motions in limine due to the defendant’s denial of access to
the state’s witnesses).206 Though Robinson’s first draft contemplated the
judge mediating pretrial disputes (an intervention that would anyway be
minimized by the eradication of a discovery phase),207 the Supreme Court,
before sending the final iteration to Congress, struck the provision
altogether.208 Throwing a bone to the traditionalists, the final draft integrated
the constitutional standards commonly included in treatises on common law
procedure, providing guidance as to grand jury proceedings, arraignment, and
the preliminary hearing.209 The new template had become the old template,
but it had been modified to further facilitate prosecutorial intentions. As
Charles Clark had warned, a reform effort that favored existing rules risked
being retrogressive.210 Whereas reform to civil procedure set in motion a
new way of resolving disputes, criminal procedure froze in time and
protected existing hierarchies. The differences between civil and criminal
practice, once small, became a yawning gap.
IV. POSTMORTEM ANALYSIS
Was the adoption of Holtzoff’s view inevitable? Could the committee
have adopted Robinson’s draft? A dissection of the committee’s meetings
helps to illuminate what happened. But why the committee did what it did
remains unknown. Some preliminary observations, set forth in this Part,
same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.”); id. 12
(amended 1974, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2002, 2014) (raising defenses); id. 14 (amended 1966,
2002) (addressing joinder issues).
205. Id. 15(a) (amended 1974, 1987, 2002, 2011).
206. A preliminary hearing provides a check, though a weak one, designed to ensure that
the defendant committed a felony so that detaining the defendant pending trial comports with
due process. See Meyn, Unbearable Lightness, supra note 7, at 61–62.
207. See Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Rules
of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States r. 15 (May 1942), in 1
MADELEINE J. WILKEN & NICHOLAS TRIFFIN, DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 60–61 (1991).
208. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (1944).
209. Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Rules of
Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States r. 5, in 1 WILKEN & TRIFFIN,
supra note 207, at 46 (arrest); id. r. 6, in 1 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 207, at 48
(preliminary hearing); id. r. 7, in 1 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 207, at 50 (grand jury
proceedings); id. r. 11, in 1 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 207, at 56 (warrant or summons
and bail upon indictment or information).
210. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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provide insight into the dynamics that influenced the committee’s decision to
reject Robinson’s vision and adopt rules rooted in the past.
A. Holtzoff at the Helm and an Amenable Crew
One wonders whether, in Holtzoff’s absence, Robinson would have
accomplished a result that bore a closer resemblance to civil procedure.
Holtzoff dominated meetings to exert a singular influence, pronouncing
opinions that had the quality of well-wrought judicial decrees.211 Holtzoff
was intimately involved in legislative affairs in his supervisory role within
the Department of Justice and, during the pendency of committee meetings,
worked with congressional leaders to secure an amendment that would
broaden the committee’s influence and, consequently, his.212 His position
held sway with others, and even today, reading from a flat transcript, Holtzoff
flies off the page as relentless. If Holtzoff’s portrayal of the civil rules was
in constant flux, he was consistent in constructing rules that preserved
prosecutorial discretion and facilitated the quick resolution of criminal
disputes.
Members like Youngquist, Crane, and Glueck appeared
predisposed to such an endeavor. Yet when Medalie took on Holtzoff,
Medalie could expect to persuade other members. These interventions,
however infrequent, reveal that committee members held diverse views. At
the same time, it was equally true that members often seemed amenable to
Holtzoff’s positions.
A deep bench of current and former prosecutors provides one explanation
for the committee’s bias toward rules that facilitated prosecution. The
committee did not seem to be aware of this overrepresentation. In a postgame
talk at the Catholic University School of Law on October 16, 1945, Chairman
Vanderbilt informed his audience that the committee had been composed of
“judges and former judges, prosecutors, district attorneys, . . . defense
counsel, [and] representatives of the Department of Justice.”213 Robinson
likewise touted the committee’s diversity, observing that the members came
from numerous states and included professors, judges, “federal and state
district attorneys, . . . assistant attorneys general, . . . defense counsel, [and]

211. In a few instances, fellow committee members revealed irritation with Holtzoff’s
recall of facts and law. For example, where Medalie thought he was correcting Holtzoff by
saying that federal banks were closed on state holidays, Holtzoff stated:
I know. The rule as to banks is this—a bank can close on any day on which you
cannot present negotiable paper under the laws of the state; that is, where you cannot
present negotiable paper on a state holiday; and that is why even federal banks close
on state holidays.
Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 106–07. Medalie responded, “We have solved
the mystery.” Id. at 107. Holtzoff would find his rightful place at the bench when President
Harry S. Truman named him to a seat on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
in
1945.
See
Holtzoff,
Alexander,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/holtzoff-alexander [https://perma.cc/YF6N-F4FV] (last
visited Oct. 16, 2017).
212. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 40–41.
213. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Preparation of the Rules, Their Adoption by the Supreme Court
and Submission to Congress, 5 F.R.D. 90, 92 (1945).
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lawyers in the general practice of law.”214 Former Attorney General Homer
Cummings was even more generous, contending that the committee had
acted as a mere conduit for ideas, apparently free of any bias.215
Yet, of the members who had criminal law experience, it was mostly
prosecutorial in nature. Holtzoff served in the Department of Justice’s
leadership as special assistant to the U.S. attorney general.216 Robinson
served as a prosecutor in Indiana.217 Medalie served twenty years as a
prosecutor—as a district attorney, a deputy state attorney general, and as the
U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York.218 Tolman was a special
attorney at the Department of Justice.219 Gordon Dean was the Department
of Justice’s criminal division chief.220 Judge Crane had served as assistant
district attorney in New York and was later considered by the Coolidge
administration for the position of U.S. attorney general.221 Youngquist
served as attorney general of Minnesota and an assistant U.S. attorney—his
journal entries revealed an impulse to join raids on dens of gangsters.222
Burke served as the prosecuting attorney in Michigan, was a member of the
Michigan Crime Commission, and ran for state attorney general.223 Dession
had a short stint at the state’s attorney’s office in Middlesex County,
Connecticut.224 Wechsler had served as an assistant attorney general.225

214. Robinson, supra note 51, at 44.
215. Cummings stated that the committee was a “conduit through which judges,
prosecutors, attorneys, government officials and others interested in the functioning of
criminal justice . . . could present their problems and make known their needs.” Dession, supra
note 34, at 697. Dession, however unintentionally, contradicted Cummings’s claim and
observed that the rules were created during the committee’s internal effort. Id. (stating that the
committee authored the initial draft of the rules, taking on “the brunt of the research, [and] the
initial policy decisions”). A review of the committee’s first meetings further contradicts
Cummings’s view; despite having at the committee’s disposal commentary from the legal
community catalogued in briefing materials, members rarely, if ever, referenced it. In fact,
the committee created five confidential drafts before distributing a draft to the public for
comment. Robinson, supra note 51, at 39. The committee was not a conduit, but it was an
author.
216. McGuire, supra note 58, at 18; Holtzoff, Alexander, supra note 211.
217. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
218. George Z. Medalie, Big-Game Prosecutor, Goes Back to Private Practice Tuesday,
JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Nov. 19, 1933), http://www.jta.org/1933/11/19/archive/
george-z-medalie-big-game-prosecutor-goes-back-to-private-practice-tuesday
[https://perma.cc/4CHH-WEBD]; Judge G.Z. Medalie Dies in Albany at 62, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
6, 1946, at 27.
219. Leland L. Tolman, 82, Ex-Court Administrator, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/15/obituaries/leland-l-tolman-82-ex-courtadministrator.html [https://perma.cc/7F48-ZEQT].
220. Gordon Dean, 52, Was Truman Aide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1958, at 78.
221. Barbara B. Mistishen, Frederick Evan Crane, HIST. SOC’Y N.Y. CTS.,
http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/luminaries-court-appeals/cranefrederick.html [https://perma.cc/7KYZ-PZXU] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
222. Postscripts, 52 MINN. HIST. 195, 195–96 (1991).
223. William B. Treml, Burke Family Law Legacy to Continue, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Aug.
30, 1986), http://oldnews.aadl.org/aa_news_19860830-burke_family_law [https://perma.cc/
37FV-CFSK].
224. Charles E. Clark, George H. Dession, 64 YALE L.J. 1103, 1103 (1955).
225. Vanderbilt, supra note 213, at 92–93.
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Seth appears to have had some experience as a prosecutor.226 As to the
remaining members, Glueck227 and Wechsler228 had not strayed from the
academy, and Vanderbilt,229 McClellan,230 Longsdorf,231 and Seasongood232
were immersed in civil practice.
Missing from this list was a criminal defense attorney. Some members,
during periods of private practice, may have represented criminal defendants.
But, with the exception of Medalie and Youngquist, no member indicated
any such experience during committee deliberations.233 Moreover, no one
noted the absence of a defense attorney on the committee.234 And Judge
Crane felt quite at ease in expressing his dim view of the criminal defense
bar.235
226. Seth, however, seemed mostly engaged in civil matters, as he was at the center of
transactions that ran the gamut from negotiating water disputes with Colorado and Texas as
New Mexico’s representative to assisting Georgia O’Keeffe with securing tax benefits. See
Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 114 (noting Seth’s work as a prosecutor);
NANCY HOPKINS REILY, GEORGIA O’KEEFFE, A PRIVATE FRIENDSHIP 366 (2007); Water Law,
MONTGOMERY & ANDREWS L. FIRM http://montand.com/practice-area/water-law/
[https://perma.cc/8U7S-8M54] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
227. See J.Y. Smith, Delinquency Authority Sheldon Glueck Dies, WASH. POST (Mar. 12,
1980),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1980/03/12/delinquency-authoritysheldon-glueck-dies/e4cd9e2b-aba0-49db-a264-af60a5aff5d1/
[https://perma.cc/8G7QHLNS]. Glueck authored prediction tables that purportedly could identify a person’s
propensity to engage in criminal behavior by the age of six; his determinism sat within a set
of rules that would ultimately assist a prosecutor to achieve a result that was, in Glueck’s mind,
already written. See Sheldon Glueck of Harvard Dies; Studied the Roots of Delinquency, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1980, at 86.
228. See Tamar Lewin, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Giant, Is Dead at 90, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
28, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/28/us/herbert-wechsler-legal-giant-is-dead-at90.html [https://perma.cc/846X-K6ZR].
229. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
230. See Boston Judge Rules Out Wire Tapping Evidence, LEWISTON DAILY SUN, May 12,
1938; McLellan, Hugh Dean, FED. JUD. CTR, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/mclellanhugh-dean [https://perma.cc/LJ5R-G8YU] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
231. See GEORGE FOSTER LONGSDORF, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL (1929).
232. See Murray Seasongood, Lawyer; Ex-Cincinnati Mayor Was 104, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
23, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/02/23/obituaries/murray-seasongood-lawyer-excincinnati-mayor-was-104.html [https://perma.cc/AF5G-9ZXF].
233. For example, Youngquist stated, “About six years ago I with a group of other attorneys
were defending one of the few cases in which I have been on the defense . . . .” Advisory
Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 545. In addition, Medalie stated, “I have tried criminal
cases where the district attorney and I stipulated facts.” Id. at 464.
234. Yet, as committee members were well aware, major cities had established public
defender offices by 1941. Los Angeles’s public defender office had existed for twenty-five
years, Chicago’s had existed for a decade, and New York City’s Legal Aid Society had existed
for more than thirty years. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 253. There
was also no federal defender at this point in time. See Julian A. Cook III, Federal Guilty Pleas
Under Rule 11: The Unfulfilled Promise of the Post-Boykin Era, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
597, 627 n.157 (2002) (noting that federal Defender Services was established by the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964).
235. Judge Crane opined that thirty percent of criminal defense attorneys should never have
been admitted to the bar and that if a defendant had money, defense attorneys would “all scrap
over it.” Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 250. Judge Crane added that criminal
law “is not like the civil end of it. It is rough business, much of it, in these great big cities.
You get a lot of lawyers who are as bad as the defendants.” Id.
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The institutional alignment with prosecutorial agencies in fact went
deeper. Robinson created his support staff with the cooperation of the U.S.
Department of Justice, Offices of the Assistant U.S. Attorney, and the
National Association of U.S. Attorneys, all of which loaned attorneys to the
effort.236 In addition, a key staff member who sat in on meetings was Fred
E. Strine, who served in the criminal division of the Department of Justice.237
Drafts passed through two committees: one was composed of federal judges,
and the other, called the Department of Justice Committee, was led by
Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge.238 Robinson noted that the
approval of these committees conferred legitimacy to the effort.239 The
committee’s final draft relied on
recommendations of Attorneys General of the United States with respect to
criminal procedure, as contained in annual reports of the Attorneys General
during the past fifty years . . . [as well as] recommendations with respect to
criminal procedure which have been made by the crime surveys, namely,
the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.240

The institutional alignment among the committee members and support
staff did not make the result inevitable. Robinson and his staff, however
oriented toward law and order, proposed a code that hewed closely to the
civil rules. Medalie, with deep ties to state and federal prosecutorial offices,
at times opposed Holtzoff. The debate among committee members was at
times robust.
Indeed, Medalie and Holtzoff engaged in a rich discussion over whether
defendants should have access to the government’s documents, which
momentarily persuaded others to block Holtzoff’s effort to do away with the
rule.241 One wonders, had members of the defense bar been represented,
whether compromises would have been made that otherwise were not. It is
one thing to be amenable to a point of view, but it is another thing to have
had an experience that engenders a visceral sense of what is at stake. The
fact that there was at times robust debate despite institutional homogeneity
highlights the reasonableness of the initial draft’s approach. With Holtzoff
at the opposition’s helm, the committe may have required the input of those
with a fundamentally different experience to represent and draw out
competing views.
B. The Gravitational Pull of Existing Practices
Robinson estimated that 95 percent of the rules in the draft released to the
public represented existing practices, whereas “not over 5 percent . . . can be
236. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
237. See Lester B. Orfield, Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 24 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 315, 318 n.18 (1949).
238. See Robinson, supra note 51, at 44.
239. See id. (indicating that, due to the input of these committees, the proposed code “will
be in general acceptable to those who value practical experience as a guide in the preparation
of rules of criminal procedure for the federal courts”).
240. Id. at 42.
241. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text.
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considered to be substantially new provisions.”242 The rules, observed
Robinson, were not characterized by any “zeal to reform present
procedure.”243 Holtzoff agreed:
[T]he approach of the Committee has been of a conservative nature. The
existing practice on each point was ascertained and modifications were
made in it only in those instances in which it affirmatively appeared that an
improvement was needed. The attitude of the Committee was not
iconoclastic but, on the contrary, its mode of operation was to build on
existing foundations.244

This was in stark contrast to the views of Charles Clark, who led the civil
reform effort and warned: “Experience teaches us, that . . . the general
professional reaction is, quite naturally, against change. . . . [A] reform of
procedure which merely adjusts itself to the majority view of the bar at best
can be only a minor readjustment, perhaps even harmful.”245 Clark was not
the only commentator to express these concerns. Said E.J. McDermott, “[I]t
is not only necessary to make the need of reform clear, but the need of it must
be incessantly dinned into the ears of the lawyers . . . until public opinion
becomes so distinct and strong that dull, conceited or stubbornly conservative
lawyers can not resist it.”246
But the committee ultimately took the path Clark sought to avoid. The
gang of four—Holtzoff, Youngquist, Crane, and Glueck—all sought to
repackage existing rules. Glueck believed a unified code would entail “too
great [a] warping” of the existing chronology.247 Glueck did not question
whether the existing chronology of criminal procedure was necessary, nor
did he articulate how the civil rules would actually disrupt the existing
chronology (which arguably could coexist).248 And, as to any disruption,
Glueck did not articulate why Robinson’s proposed path was not an
improvement.249
In embracing existing practices, the committee vaunted the code’s
simplicity. Dession noted that the entire code, from complaint through
appeal, was “sixty small pages of large print” and that, reduced to a pocket
edition, “would take up no more space than a box of matches.”250 But this
simplicity reflected the omission of a discovery phase. Members reasoned
that a discovery phase was unnecessary, that trial would compensate for its

242. Id. at 42–43 (explaining that the sources of criminal procedure reform included
“federal and state constitutions and statutes, the common law at various periods in the legal
history of the United States, of the states and of England, the decisions of federal, state and
English courts, the rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court and by other federal
courts, and the traditional details of practice and of administrative procedure which are not to
be found in written or printed form”).
243. Id. at 43.
244. Holtzoff, supra note 135, at 139.
245. Clark & Moore, supra note 23, at 390.
246. McDermott, supra note 22, at 358.
247. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 17.
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. Dession, supra note 34, at 694.
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absence,251 and that a “witness upon the stand is far superior to his
deposition.”252
The committee’s embrace of existing practices was consistent with a
historical resistance to considering the rights of a criminal defendant. Jerome
Hall viewed the historical development of criminal procedure to ever so
slowly recognize a role for defendants within a process that presumed
guilt.253 Procedure initially permitted guilt to be determined by ordeal where
procedure and evidence were inextricable—where procedure itself, drowning
or being burned by hot irons, revealed evidence of culpability. As the law of
procedure became distinct from evidence, the defendant’s role continued to
be minimal. Procedure permitted a trial and the presentation of evidence, but
it did not provide a means for a defendant to question witnesses.254 The
defendant’s role slowly increased over centuries, as he eventually became
entitled to a public trial and could confront witnesses.255 The criminal
defendant, relative to other litigants, however, continued playing a lesser
role; as of Hall’s writing in 1942, states were still debating whether a criminal
defendant was entitled to object to defects in an indictment.256 To Hall,
tradition—the “deep imprint of professional methods, and most of all, the
existing range of thought and evaluation”—imposed “rigorous limitations on
actual deliberate change.”257 Hall and Robinson’s efforts to transform
criminal procedure met a tradition of resistance. As Holtzoff had observed,
ignoring the counterexample provided by civil procedure reform, “The only
time we run any risk of rejection [of a proposed rule] is when we change the
practice.”258
C. Missing Objectives, but Also Hidden Objectives
Unlike Robinson, who provided a rationale for his first draft, Holtzoff
never explicitly proposed a rationale to guide the committee’s review.
Indicative of this failure, the Supreme Court denied the committee’s first
request to distribute a draft to the public because the Court was unable to
understand the rules’ “true purport and the nature of the problems which they
251. See 1942 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 172 (letter from James J.
Robinson to members of the advisory committee).
252. George Rossman, Arraignment and Preparation for Trial, 5 F.R.D. 63, 74 (1945).
This assertion, however, assumes that taking a deposition precludes advancing to trial. And,
in the context of a typical trial, one should wonder whether the cross-examination of a state’s
witness in the absence of a deposition presents a significant risk of fortifying the state’s case.
253. See Hall, supra note 7, at 728–32.
254. See Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 537, 545–46
(2003).
255. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884) (“[T]he legislature has deemed it essential
to the protection of one whose life or liberty is involved in a prosecution for felony that he
shall be personally present at the trial; that is, at every stage of the trial when his substantial
rights may be affected by the proceedings against him. If he be deprived of his life or liberty
without being so present, such deprivation would be without that due process of law required
by the constitution.”).
256. Hall, supra note 7, at 723.
257. Id.
258. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 111.
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are thought to solve.”259 The absence of a clear rationale was evident when
at the start of the first meeting of the full committee, Wechsler stated:
The object of [the conformity rule, Rule 2,] is to secure interpretation in
accordance with the interpretation of the civil rules and presumably to
incorporate into the interpretative job here the policies that achieve
dominance in the work on the civil rules. Now, without expressing a
judgment as to whether that is wise or unwise, because I do not know
enough about the civil rules and the grim detail that they present,
nevertheless a priori it seems to me to be questionable, because we are
dealing with situations in criminal cases in which the dominant policies
may well be different.260

Wechsler’s objection is well taken; a committee charged with drafting a
procedural code should agree on, or at least discuss, its objectives. His
observation revealed that the committee had not discussed its values.
Vanderbilt had instructed the committee to start with Rule 1 and continue in
seriatim.261 No space was carved out to accommodate a broader discussion
that would attend to Wechsler’s concerns.
In the absence of any explicit, guiding principles, various members
announced that criminal law was just different. Vanderbilt stated “that the
problems of criminal law . . . are quite different from some of the problems
of civil law.”262 Holtzoff added,
I am impressed very much with the fact that the problems of criminal
procedure are so different, the work in criminal cases so different from
trying a civil case, that it would be dangerous to tie the criminal rules too
strongly to the civil rules, either textually or by rule of construction.263

Absent, however, was the rationale for this perceived difference. Holtzoff
did later elaborate on the philosophy that had guided his approach. After the
draft was distributed to the public, he asserted that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure
[i]n a larger sense . . . must necessarily crystallize a philosophy of
administration of criminal justice. . . . [I]t must be conducive to a simple,
effective, and expeditious prosecution of crimes. Perpetrators of crimes
must be detected, apprehended and punished. The conviction of the guilty
must not be unduly delayed. Criminals should not go unwhipped of justice
because of technicalities having no connection with the merits of the
accusation. The protection of the law-abiding citizen from the ravages of
the criminal is one of the principal functions of government. Any form of
criminal procedure that unnecessarily hampers and unduly hinders the
259. Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., to Arthur
T. Vanderbilt, Chairman, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure (June 8,
1942), in 1 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 207, at 7 (“The Court’s study of the proposed
Criminal Rules has been without the aid of annotations such as were submitted to us with the
first draft of the Civil Rules, which would appear to be needful to enable us to understand
adequately many features of the Rules both in point of form and substance.”).
260. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 18.
261. See id. at 43.
262. Id. at 21.
263. Id. at 22.
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successful fulfillment of this duty must be discarded or radically
changed.264

The full committee may not have agreed with this approach. Yet, sub
silentio, this view of criminal procedure’s purpose drove reform.
Given that the first draft incorporated the civil rules, it is not unreasonable
to think that the committee might have submitted a unified code to the
Supreme Court. The confluence of circumstances, a dogged effort by
Holtzoff, an institutionally aligned committee, a gravitation toward existing
practices, and an unexpressed, powerful set of objectives may have
contributed to the formation of a code that stands in stark contrast to the
neutrality achieved by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION
Reformers of federal civil procedure provided a new roadmap for litigation
in the United States in 1938.265 Merging law and equity, the code simplified
pleading, permitted joinder of multiple claims and parties, empowered parties
to investigate their cases, and invited courts to influence a lawsuit’s
development. The reform’s sweeping changes received widespread
acceptance and broadly influenced state codes.266 It was in this atmosphere
of reassessment and innovation that a newly appointed advisory committee
charged with reforming the rules of criminal procedure considered whether
all disputes, civil and criminal, might be governed by a unified code.
The potential impact of a unified code would have been far reaching. No
longer a passive participant, a criminal defendant would be procedurally
assigned a role to investigate the case, thereby vesting him with agency in a
dispute. The integration of a robust discovery phase would permit
opportunities to test the integrity of allegations in the absence of a trial. The
invitation of judicial management would further disrupt prosecutorial
control. Such a model would achieve some balance between the aims of
efficiency and accuracy. At the same time, a unified code of procedure would
presumably increase prosecutorial drag. In the context of mass incarceration,
however, this eventuality might be viewed as a benefit rather than a cost.
Led by Holtzoff, the reform of criminal procedure integrated civil rules
that increased efficiency, like notice pleading and liberalized joinder, but
rejected countermeasures designed to ensure accuracy, like judicial
intervention and discovery tools. In this way, the committee did not actually
integrate aspects of the civil code but instead created an entirely different
code with new dynamics. Holtzoff’s gravitation toward a stripped-down
criminal code stemmed from his belief that the criminal justice system had
become fair and just. He believed that the common law technicalities had
served their function, which was “to ameliorate the rigors of the criminal law

264. Holtzoff, supra note 135, at 121.
265. See Clark & Moore, supra note 23, at 388.
266. See Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2, supra note 34, at 4 (statement of Alexander
Holtzoff).
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at a time when it was almost savage in its ferocity.”267 Holtzoff thought such
cruelties of the criminal law had been cured by evolving standards and the
professionalization of law enforcement.268 A few years after Holtzoff’s
assertion of faith in the criminal justice system, President Harry S. Truman
convened a commission that issued a report on the state of civil rights that
catalogued police terror and injustice in the courtroom:
[A defendant] sometimes finds that the judicial process itself does not
give him full and equal justice. This may appear in unfair and perfunctory
trials, or in fines and prison sentences that are heavier than those imposed
on other members of the community guilty of the same offenses. In part,
the inability of the Negro, Mexican, or Indian to obtain equal justice may
be attributed to extrajudicial factors. The low income of a member of any
one of these minorities may prevent him from securing competent counsel
to defend his rights. It may prevent him from posting bail or bond to secure
his release from jail during trial. It may predetermine his choice, upon
conviction, of paying a fine or going to jail. But these facts should not
obscure or condone the extent to which the judicial system itself is
responsible for the less-than-equal justice meted out to members of certain
minority groups.269

Holtzoff seemed insulated from a growing consciousness regarding police
misconduct, a burgeoning list of new crimes that expanded prosecutorial
discretion, and the salience of race and class to outcomes in the criminal
justice system.270 Despite writing at the height of Jim Crow, Holtzoff
thought that “[c]riminals should not go unwhipped of justice because of
technicalities” and believed procedures that slowed criminal law outcomes
were “meaningless and arouse[d] risibility.”271 Holtzoff’s belief in systemwide integrity helps explain why he took the positions he did in constructing
the criminal procedural code. Today, his vision remains baked in.
Over the course of four days, the committee made decisions that directly
contributed to the perceived differences between civil and criminal matters.
Indicative of how Holtzoff began to hammer a wedge between criminal and
civil practice, the few civil litigators appointed to the committee began to feel
more and more excluded. By the second day, Longsdorf, a civil litigator who
should have felt qualified to participate given the nature of Robinson’s first
draft, stated, “I have not any experience in criminal practice, which raises a
267. Holtzoff, supra note 135, at 123.
268. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 89. Holtzoff seemed resistant,
however, to seeing inequalities in structural terms; for example, Holtzoff stated, “I would
dislike to see any requirement introduced which would require defendants to file written pleas,
because some of them cannot write their names.” Id.
269. TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 27–28 (1947).
270. Id.; cf. Lyda Gordon Shivers, The Office of the Public Defender, 2 MISS. L.J. 462, 464
(1930) (“The charge is often hurled at the legal system of the State that a member of the Negro
race in the majority of cases does not secure justice in our courts. This we indignantly deny
stating that if it be true that the Negro does not in many cases secure justice (and we deny that
he does not receive it) still it is not because of racial discrimination, but that he faces the same
situation as the poor white man.”).
271. Holtzoff, supra note 135, at 121, 123.
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good deal of doubt as to whether I ought to be here.”272 As Holtzoff cleaved
the criminal rules from civil rules, Longsdorf felt less and less relevant,
indicative of Robinson’s fear that segregating procedure would segregate
litigators and create two different worlds.273 It has.
But it did not have to, as the origin story of criminal procedure reveals.
Rather, the current iteration of criminal procedure was the alternative. The
first draft, and its full integration of civil rules, was created over a span of six
months by Robinson and his team through intensive study and collaboration
with members of the legal establishment. However, Holtzoff, by force of
personality, altered the anticipated course of criminal procedure. This
revelation invites a reexamination of the prevailing view that procedural
differences in criminal and civil disputes are inevitable, or for that matter,
appropriate.

272. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 265.
273. See id. at 4.

